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ABSTRACT 
Since taking office in 2001, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi has pressed for 
greater expansion to the mission of the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF), first by 
endorsing deployments in support of counter-terrorism operations in the Indian Ocean, 
and eventually the domestically unpopular decision to deploy to Iraq. Recently, an update 
to the 1996 National Defense Program Outline was published that accelerated the shift in 
the mission of the JSDF away from a pure self-defense force capable of operating with 
the United States in defense of Japan’s sovereignty to that of an internationally 
recognized force capable of conducting operations in varying environments throughout 
the globe. Japan’s accelerated military involvement in world affairs has provoked 
concerns among neighbors, whose perceptions are often quite different from those of the 
United States or Japan. Japan’s legacy of militarism has created resistance to change 
among regional partners. In order for changes to succeed without upsetting the regional 
balance of power, Japan must improve not only the capability, but also the international 
trust and standing of the JSDF. This thesis provides information to allow policy makers 
to better understand the challenges that the Government of Japan will face in response to 































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
I.         INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENTS................................................2 
B. ASSUMPTIONS...............................................................................................2 
C. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY......................................................3 
II. THE CHANGING MISSION FOR THE JAPAN SELF DEFENSE FORCES.....5 
A. THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF THE JSDF...............................................5 
B. JAPAN’S COLD WAR ROLE .......................................................................7 
C. JAPAN’S CHANGING POST-COLD WAR ROLE....................................9 
D. JAPAN’S ACTIVE DEFENSE POLICY ....................................................11 
E. THE ROAD AHEAD FOR JAPAN’S SECURITY POLICY ...................13 
F. WHAT IS A “NORMAL” NATION?..........................................................13 
G. CASE STUDIES.............................................................................................14 
1. Counter-terrorism Operations in the Indian Ocean.......................14 
2. Iraqi Stability Operations .................................................................15 
3. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)..............................................17 
4. Tsunami Relief ...................................................................................18 
5. Ballistic Missile Defense ....................................................................19 
6. Japan’s Historical Issues ...................................................................21 
III. NORTH KOREAN REACTIONS TO EXPANDING THE JSDF........................25 
A. NORTH KOREA AND JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS .....................26 
B. NORTH KOREAN DIPLOMATIC AND SECURITY OPTIONS...........30 
C. COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN ..31 
D. IRAQI STABILITY OPERATIONS ...........................................................32 
E. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI) ................................32 
F. TSUNAMI RELIEF.......................................................................................34 
G. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE...............................................................34 
H. RESOLUTION OF HISTORICAL ISSUES...............................................35 
I. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................36 
IV. CHINESE REACTIONS TO EXPANDING THE JSDF.......................................39 
A. JAPAN AND CHINA SECURITY RELATIONS ......................................40 
B. CHINESE DIPLOMATIC AND SECURITY OPTIONS..........................44 
C. COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN ..45 
D. IRAQI STABILITY OPERATIONS ...........................................................46 
E. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI) ................................47 
F. TSUNAMI RELIEF.......................................................................................48 
G. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE...............................................................49 
H. RESOLUTION OF HISTORICAL ISSUES...............................................50 
I. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................54 
V. SOUTH KOREAN REACTIONS TO EXPANDING THE JSDF ........................57 
A. JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS.........................................58 
 viii
B. SOUTH KOREAN DIPLOMATIC AND SECURITY OPTIONS ...........63 
C. COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN ..64 
D. IRAQI STABILITY OPERATIONS ...........................................................65 
E. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI) ................................65 
F. TSUNAMI RELIEF.......................................................................................66 
G. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE...............................................................67 
H. RESOLUTION OF HISTORICAL ISSUES...............................................67 
I. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................70 
VI. CONCLUSION - MANAGING GLOBAL PERCEPTIONS ................................73 
A. REGIONAL VIEWS OF THE JSDF...........................................................73 
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF NORMALIZATION EFFORTS.....................73 
C. OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. SUPPORT TO JSDF EXPANSION .........74 
APPENDIX A: TIMELINE OF EVENTS AFFECTING JAPANESE 
SECURITY POLICY, MARCH 1990 TO JANUARY 2005..................................77 
APPENDIX B: DEPLOYMENTS OF THE JAPAN SELF-DEFENSE FORCE 
FOR OVERSEAS MISSIONS..................................................................................87 
APPENDIX C: JAPANESE TRADE STATISTICS, 1975-2004..............................89 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................91 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................101 
 
 ix




Figure 1. North Korean and Chinese Ballistic Missiles Capable of Reaching Japan .....20 
Figure 2. Japanese Public Opinion of China ...................................................................53 





























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi




Table 1. North Korean Perceptions of Japanese Stability and Security Activities ........37 
Table 2. Chinese Perceptions of Japanese Stability and Security Activities .................55 





























There are numerous people who have helped me in the writing of this thesis.  First 
and foremost are my thesis advisors Professors H. Lyman Miller and Edward A. Olsen.  
Their knowledge of East Asian security matters has never ceased to impress me.  I am 
also extremely thankful to Professor Tsuneo Akaha of the Monterey Institute of 
International Studies for his assistance in developing a methodology to analyze the case 
studies.  I would also like to thank Professor Yumiko Ohara of the University of Hawai’i 
at Hilo for her assistance in helping me to understand Japanese cultural issues revolving 
around the history textbook controversy. この度は私の卒業論文のために、御指導、 
ご配慮頂き誠にありがとうごさいました。 
This thesis also would not been possible without the many U.S. and Japanese 
civilian and military personnel that I worked with during my assignment at United States 
Forces Japan, who taught me, among other things, the value of the U.S.–Japan security 
partnership.  I would like to thank my wife Tomoko for her tireless translation efforts and 
her infinite patience and support for me during the many long nights put in during my 
studies.  I could not have achieved the level success that I have without her.  Finally, I 
would like to thank our little girl, for waiting until after this thesis is finished to bless our 




























                                                
I.     INTRODUCTION  
Since taking office in April 2001, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro has 
pressed for greater expansion of the mission of the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF), first 
by endorsing deployments in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in the Indian 
Ocean, and eventually the domestically unpopular decision to deploy the Japan Ground 
Self Defense Force (JGSDF) to Samawah, Iraq.1  Most recently, on December 10, 2004, 
the Koizumi administration published an update to the 1996 National Defense Program 
Outline2 (NDPO) and accompanying Mid-Term Defense Plan3 (MTDP).   This plan has 
accelerated the shift in the mission of the Japan Self Defense Force away from a pure 
self-defense force capable of operating with the United States in defense of Japan’s 
sovereignty to that of an internationally recognized force capable of conducting a wide 
range of operations in varying geopolitical environments throughout the globe.   
This movement for a greater role for the JSDF did not, however, start with Prime 
Minister Koizumi.  Instead it can be traced back to the foundation of the predecessor to 
the JSDF, the National Police Reserve, in 1954.  Over the course of the Cold War the 
mission of the JSDF evolved to meet the requirements levied on it by Japan’s 
international situation and its strategic partner, the United States.  A major acceleration in 
the pace of changes can be traced to the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, when Japan was 
strongly criticized by the United States and other Western allies for providing only 
economic aid.  Considering Japan’s history of militarism, the aid package was seen in 
Japan as both generous and appropriate.  While the JSDF still has a long way to go both 
legally  and  doctrinally  before  it  has  the  capability  to operate militarily as a “normal”  
 
1 According to a joint Asahi Shimbun and Uruk Shimbun poll in November 2004, 62 percent of 
Japanese opposed extending the deployment of the JGSDF in Iraq, this is compared to 52 percent who 
opposed the deployment from a similar poll conducted by Kyodo News in January 2004. Toru Hayano. 
“Self-Serving Utilization of Opinion Poll Data.” Asahi Shimbun, December 17, 2004. 
http://www.asahi.com/column/hayano/eng/TKY200412170133.html (accessed December 20, 2004). and 
Japan Times. “51.6% Oppose SDF Dispatch to Iraq but Cabinet Support Up.” January 19, 2004. 
http://202.221.217.59/print/news/nn01-2004/nn20040119a1.htm (accessed December 20, 2004). 
2 In Japanese this was published as: 防衛計画の大綱 
3 In Japanese:中期防衛力整備計画 
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nation, Japan’s accelerated military involvement in world affairs has provoked concerns 
among regional neighbors, whose perceptions are often quite different from those of the 
United States or Japan.  
The JSDF is already one of the most technologically advanced militaries in the 
world. Therefore, developing a regional or global presence will not require major defense 
acquisitions. The key to developing an internationally recognized military presence will 
be gradual changes in capabilities and, more importantly, mission. Japan’s legacy of 
militarism and abuses in Asia will create resistance to change among the regional 
partners. In order for changes to succeed without upsetting the regional balance of power, 
Japan must improve not only the capability, but also the international acceptance and 
standing of the Self Defense Forces.  It also must be stressed that creating a viable 
military does not mean that Japan will have to return to a path of militarism. 
A. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENTS 
This thesis investigates causal factors in determining how the changing mission of 
the JSDF affects the regional balance of power.  It also identifies the main regional 
obstacles in expanding the role and capabilities of the JSDF through a review of historical 
reactions to acquisition of new capabilities and missions by the JSDF.  Changes in the 
JSDF missions since 1991 are compared in light of the perceived motivation for change, 
broken into the categories of globalist, regionalist and nationalist.   In addition, changes 
in capabilities and policy can be also divided into security or stability oriented categories.  
Reaction to changes of mission and doctrine have been seen differently by the various 
regional powers, mission changes accepted as a stabilizing force by South Korea are 
often seen as a direct challenge by China.  In addition to studying defense policy, 
significant non-military political issues, such as visits by Prime Minister Koizumi to 
Yasukuni Jinja and the government approval of controversial history textbooks can 
complicate efforts to improve the trust and standing of the JSDF.  
B. ASSUMPTIONS 
In developing this thesis the following assumptions have been made throughout.  
First, Japan must remain committed to a doctrine that renounces the right to belligerency 
of a state.  Although some statements by senior government officials have indicated a 
3 
belief in Japan’s right to preempt an attack on itself, adoption of a policy similar to the 
United States preventive war strategy would seriously upset the regional balance of 
power.  Second, Japan must continue to condemn the use and possession of nuclear 
weapons.  Even if nuclear weapons were developed in response to a nuclear armed and 
capable North Korea, a nuclear-armed Japan would almost certainly trigger a nuclear 
arms race in the rest of Asia.  Third, the United States–Japan security alliance must 
continue with no significant changes to the United States security guarantee.  Although 
changes in the United States’ Far East force structure will undoubtedly emerge in the near 
term, the commitment to the defense of Japan should never be in doubt.  Fourth, it is 
assumed that Japan will not be subject to a major terrorist attack similar to that occurring 
in the United States on September 11, 2001.  Such an attack would likely provide 
justification for strongly nationalistic forces in Japan to push a more active “Japan First” 
defense policy agenda. 
C. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This thesis is organized into five chapters.  Chapter II provides an outline of the 
evolution of the JSDF.  The main focus is on changes taking place since 1991, with 
special emphasis on the 1996 and 2004 National Defense Program Outlines and the 
associated Mid-Term Defense Reviews. It is important to not only understand the 
changes called for in these documents, but also how the implementation has been carried 
out as perceptions can change based on whether the changes are based on a global, 
regional or nationalist framework.  This provides the basis for understanding the 
reactions by countries profiled in Chapter III and Chapter IV. 
Chapter III addresses how interaction between Japan and North Korea has 
changed due to increased military capability, an expansion of the mission of the JSDF, as 
well as how non-military issues have upset the security relationships.  Japan justifies 
many steps on countering a perceived threat by North Korea. Incidents involving the 
launch of a Taepo Dong missile in 1998, as well as incursions into Japanese waters by 
North Korean motherships, the acknowledgment of Japanese citizens kidnapped by North 
Korea and the recent nuclear crisis have fueled an antagonistic relationship between 
Japan and North Korea that could affect the regional security balance.  
4 
Chapter IV analyzes China’s reaction to JSDF expansion.  As a growing power in 
Asia and the world, China is increasingly interacting with Japan in economic and military 
matters.  This interaction consists of both competition against and cooperation with 
Japan.  This chapter studies what events have led to a confrontation with China and how 
China views the role of the JSDF in global and regional affairs, as well as Chinese fears 
of Japanese involvement in a Taiwan Strait crisis. 
Chapter V examines the relationship between South Korea and Japan. While a 
shared adversary in North Korea has historically helped to improve Japan-South Korea 
relations, continuation of South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy” has undermined this 
relationship.  South Korea’s view of Japan differs starkly from that of either North Korea 
or China, and thus South Korea’s reaction to Japan’s “normalization” efforts differs 
greatly from its neighbors. 
Chapter VI summarizes the findings and present conclusions.  This chapter also 
outlines decisions that the Government of Japan will face in the near term in deciding on 
what role Japan will take in world and regional affairs.  This assessment is intended to 
allow policy makers to better understand the challenges that the Government of Japan 
will face in the next few years.  In addition, an analysis is presented of ways that the 
United States and Japan can work together to ensure that the new force expands the 
capability of the government of Japan to react to regional and global crises without 




                                                
II. THE CHANGING MISSION FOR THE JAPAN SELF 
DEFENSE FORCES 
Although the role of the JSDF has evolved since the founding of the National 
Police Reserve in 1954, these changes have been much more pronounced since 1991.  In 
order to understand the regional implications of these changes, they must be analyzed in 
light of the perceived domestic or international motivation for change, broken into the 
categories of global, regional and national as well as identified as security or stability 
oriented in nature.  Using this methodology matrix, future changes can be examined in 
accordance with their expected impact on foreign relations.  It is important to not only 
understand changes in published doctrine or orders of battle, but also the process by 
which the implementation is carried out.  Often regional reaction is shaped not by 
introduction of a new system or doctrine, but the perception that regional neighbors 
formulate during the actual introduction of new systems and implementation of new 
doctrines. 
A. THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF THE JSDF 
The surrender of Japan in 1945 led to both a culture of anti-militarism in Japan 
and a fear of a future militaristic emergence by Japan’s regional neighbors.  Internally, as 
the military lost control of the security situation in Japan the people turned their backs on 
the military, but simultaneously continued to fear becoming the victim of foreign powers.  
As Karl Van Wolferen explained it, “A common Japanese term, higaisha ishiki 
(victimhood consciousness), reflects a diffuse but fairly strong sense that the world 
cannot be trusted and that Japan will always be a potential victim of capricious external 
forces.”4 With the arrival of American troops, the Japanese people looked to not only 
“reconstructing buildings but also rethinking what it meant to speak of a good life and a 
good society.”5 Soon the occupation authority set about the task of redefining Japan.  On 
11 October 1945, General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
 
4 Karel Van Wolferen, “No Brakes, No Compass,” The National Interest 26 (1991): 26. For a study of 
how higaisha ishiki ties into modern Japanese business dealings see Robert M. March, The Japanese 
Negotiator: Subtlety and Strategy Beyond Western Logic (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1988). 
5 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Co./New Press, 1999), 25. 
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Powers, met with the new Japanese premier, Shidehara Kijuro, to order the complete 
“liberalization of the constitution” with the extension of rights to women, promotion of 
labor unions, open liberal schools and most important to Japan’s future role in world 
affairs, the adoption of what would become Article IX of the Constitution which “forever 
renounced war as a sovereign right of a nation and the threat or use of force as means of 
settling international disputes.”6
Japan was initially relegated to the role of a disarmed neutral nation, but the 
communist revolution in China, the outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula and a 
growing Cold War with the Soviet Union reinforced to the Japanese and United States 
governments the requirement to establish a strong ally in East Asia.  By July 1950, 
changes to the interpretation of Article IX had already started with the formation of a 
75,000 member National Police Reserve, intent on maintaining internal peace and order, 
not on protecting Japan from outside aggression.7 This force eventually was renamed into 
the Japan Self Defense Forces in July 1954.8  The JSDF were created under strict 
bureaucratic control and authorized to use force “only in cases that meet the so-called 
three necessities conditions of self-defense: when there has been a sudden and 
unjustifiable aggression against Japan, when there is no other means to cope with this 
aggression than the use of the right of self-defense, and when the use of the right of self-
defense is kept within the necessary minimum.”9 Neither the United States nor other 
nations were eager to see a remilitarized and independent Japan emerge.  In order to 
ensure that Japan did not feel unduly threatened by instability in the region, the United 
States developed a series of security guarantees with Japan.   
The 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which outlined the roles of 
United States Forces in protecting Japan, was a key part of this system.  It reinforced the 
United States’ role in protecting Japan, specifically in Articles V and VI.  In Article V of 
 
6 Hugh Borton, Japan's Modern Century (New York: Ronald Press, 1955), 491. 
7 Masamichi Royama, “Problems in Self-Defense,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 308, Japan Since Recovery of Independence (1956): 167. 
8 Nihon Boueichou (Japan Defense Agency), “Defense of Japan 1999,” (Tokyo: Defense Agency, 
1999), 311-312. 
9 Nihon Boueichou (Japan Defense Agency), “Defense of Japan 1982,” (Tokyo: Defense Agency, 
1982), 69. 
7 
                                                
the treaty, the United States Forces Japan's area of responsibility was declared as “the 
land areas of the Japanese archipelago and the adjoining sea areas.” Article VI further 
provided the United States “use of facilities in Japan for maintaining regional security.”10 
To reinforce Japan’s peaceful status in world security affairs, the “Three Non-Nuclear 
Principles” of not possessing, not manufacturing and not introducing nuclear weapons 
into Japan was developed, principles that Japan still strongly holds on to today. 
B. JAPAN’S COLD WAR ROLE 
Although the security agreement with the United States provided basic protection 
to Japan, an American presence was not always embraced.  For example, during the 
Johnson administration, relations with the Japanese revolved primarily around the war in 
Vietnam.  This created extreme tension as the Japanese public was strongly opposed to 
the war and Johnson was displeased with Japan’s reluctance to involve itself more 
actively in Asian security affairs.  This tension was partially resolved at the 1967 
Johnson-Sato summit when Prime Minister Sato Eisaku agreed to support the U.S. 
position in return for greater Japanese involvement in Okinawa.11  This was taken a step 
further in the 1969 Nixon-Sato summit when Japan agreed to recognize its own interest in 
maintaining security in the region in exchange for the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese 
jurisdiction, which finally occurred in 1972.  The recognition by Japan of its own security 
responsibilities, however, was not enough for the Nixon administration, which saw a 
greater need for Asian states to provide for their own defense.  The “Nixon Doctrine,”12 
as it came to be called, emphasized the belief that while the United States would assist in 
maintaining a nation’s security, it was that nation’s primary responsibility to provide for 
its own defense.  While formulated from the American experiences in Vietnam, it also, in 
the Nixon administration’s view, applied to Japan.  Both the surprise resumption of 
relations with China and the various economic policies of the Nixon administration aimed 
at reducing Japan’s mercantilist approach to trade were efforts to bring Japan closer to 
 
10 “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan.” 
1960. http://usfj.mil/references/treaty1.html (accessed 24 November 2004). 
11 Rust M. Deming, “The Changing American Government Perspective on the Missions and Strategic 
Focus of the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” in The Future of America's Alliances in Northeast Asia, ed. Michael H. 
Armacost and Daniel I. Okimoto (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2004), 56. 
12 Initially known as the “Guam Doctrine” in recognition of the site of its original proclamation in 
1969. 
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normalizing its status in the international community.  Relations between Washington 
and Tokyo were not, however, always confrontational.  The Nixon administration 
supported Japan’s accelerated normalization of relations with Beijing, allowed Japan to 
break from U.S. policy during the 1973 OPEC crisis.  President Nixon’s administration 
also was the first to express support for Japan becoming a permanent member of the 
United Nations Security Council.13  Even with these efforts to “normalize” Japan’s 
military and security capabilities, it became increasingly evident that they remained 
inadequate. 
Japan’s vulnerability was highlighted on September 6, 1976 when Soviet Air 
Force Lieutenant Viktor Belenko flew his MiG-25 to Hakodate airfield in Hokkaido.  
This erupted into a major international incident as the United States and Japan quickly 
dismantled the aircraft to study its construction and capabilities.  While the return of the 
aircraft not only caused major tension between the Soviet Union, Japan and the United 
States, it also brought to light the vulnerability of the Japanese air defense system.  The 
Japanese Air Self Defense Force was not able to launch aircraft in time to intercept the 
Soviet aircraft. This embarrassment helped to fuel calls for greater funding for air defense 
capabilities and the development of Japan’s “reconnaissance power.”14
The month after the MiG-25 incident the National Defense Council and the 
Cabinet approved the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO).  While not 
directing the institution of major changes in the organization or equipment of the Self 
Defense Forces, the 1976 NDPO did establish “the most appropriate defense goal” as 
being the “maintenance of a full surveillance posture in peacetime and the ability to cope 
effectively with situations up to the point of limited and small scale aggression.”15  It 
placed particular emphasis on the Air Self Defense Force’s capability to maintain 
“vigilance and surveillance throughout Japanese airspace” and to be able to take 
 
13 Deming, “The Changing American Government Perspective on the Missions and Strategic Focus of 
the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” 57. 
14 Joseph M. Ha and John Guinasso, “Japan's Rearmament Dilemma: The Paradox of Recovery,” 
Pacific Affairs 53, no. 2 (1980): 253. 
15 Nihon Boueichou (Japan Defense Agency), “Defense of Japan 1991,” (Tokyo: Defense Agency, 
1991), 200. 
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immediate and appropriate steps against violations of Japanese airspace…”16 This also 
led to the acquisition of F-15 fighters from the United States the following year and the 
E-2C airborne surveillance aircraft in 1979.17
Even with these improvements in capability, Japan was still dependent on the 
United States for maintaining an overall strategic deterrence to the Soviet Union.  This 
was further exposed in 1977 when the Carter administration proposed removing U.S. 
forces from the Korean peninsula without a quid pro quo from the Soviet Union.  
Although heavy pressure from Japan forced the Carter administration to back away from 
its proposal, the seeds of doubt over the U.S. commitment to Japanese security were 
firmly planted in Japanese strategic thinkers.  Japan’s views on security changed further 
with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and buildup of Soviet forces in the Far 
East.  The Reagan administration saw Japan as a key partner in containing the “evil 
empire” and pushed Japan to take more responsibility in maintaining international 
security.  Pressure from the United States led Japan to break the 1 percent of GNP limit 
imposed on defense spending, share military technology with the United States and even 
consider joining in the development of a missile defense system.18 The election of Prime 
Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro in 1982, a long time supporter of a strong Japanese defense 
program, accelerated changes.  His summits with President Reagan in January and May 
of 1983 solidified the U.S.–Japan security relationship.19 Japan was eager to present itself 
as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” to the Soviet Union and the United States reciprocated 
by demanding a global “zero based” solution to international security.20
C. JAPAN’S CHANGING POST-COLD WAR ROLE 
Although Japan’s neo-mercantilist trade policy in the 1980s was increasingly at 
odds with the United States, it found that the large influx of capital allowed Japan to 
 
16 Nihon Boueichou (Japan Defense Agency), “Defense of Japan 1991,” 203. 
17 Nihon Boueichou (Japan Defense Agency), “Defense of Japan 1999,” 317. 
18 Deming, “The Changing American Government Perspective on the Missions and Strategic Focus of 
the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” 58-59. 
19 The personal relationship between President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone was so close that 
it came to be called the Ron-Yasu relationship.  For recollections by Prime Minister Nakasone on the 
relationship see: http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20040708-61.html  
20 Deming, “The Changing American Government Perspective on the Missions and Strategic Focus of 
the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” 59. 
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conduct its own kinken gaiko (checkbook diplomacy), which focused on Japan providing 
economic instead of security support during times of crisis abroad.   This policy 
continued to be the main source of international representation up until the 1991 Gulf 
War.  Japan’s inability to deploy even military support or medical forces during the build 
up and its deployment of minesweepers long after hostilities ended met with strong 
criticism in the United States and Europe.21 While understanding of the cultural and legal 
limits of deploying forces, Washington saw Japan’s passive response as disappointing, 
considering Japan’s dedication to the “[United Nations], the rule of law, and stability in 
the Middle East.”22 Since then, Japan has embarked on a program to internationalize its 
Self Defense Forces through United Nations sponsored Peace Keeping Operations, 
exercises with foreign countries, increased foreign port visits and, most recently, support 
for the U.S.-led coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Although legislation was introduced to the Diet in the fall of 1990 to allow a more 
active role for the JSDF in the Middle East, it was hastily constructed and easily defeated 
by opposition in the upper house.23  This embarrassment due to political inaction caused 
Japan to seriously reconsider its position in world affairs. As the 1990s progressed, the 
“Japan problem” debate in the United States continued, with many Americans 
complaining of Japan’s unwillingness to provide support in military security, while 
simultaneously providing a challenge to the U.S. economy.  At the same time many 
critics in Japan were afraid that removing restrictions on the deployment of Self Defense 
Forces overseas would lead inevitably to a resurgence of militarism, effectively letting 
the Japanese “genie out of the bottle.”  Ironically, the approval to deploy aircraft for 
refugee support (later cancelled) and minesweepers to assist in opening waterways 




21 Francis Fukuyama and Kong Dan Oh, The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship after the Cold War 
(Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1993), 17. 
22 Deming, “The Changing American Government Perspective on the Missions and Strategic Focus of 
the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” 61. 
23 Jiro Yamaguchi, “The Gulf War and the Transformation of Japanese Constitutional Politics,” 
Journal of Japanese Studies 18, no. 1 (1992): 165. 
24 Yamaguchi, “The Gulf War and the Transformation of Japanese Constitutional Politics,” 166-167. 
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D. JAPAN’S ACTIVE DEFENSE POLICY 
Following the Gulf War embarrassment, Japan began to look for new ways to 
balance the military and economic aspects of Japan’s security policy.  In 1995 Japan 
published an update to the 1976 NDPO.  The 1995 NDPO was intended to move Japan 
away from the Cold War deployment and capabilities and to develop a “flexible defense 
capability that can respond to various situations.”25  Particularly important was the 
redistribution of forces in Japan, with a reduction in the Japan Ground Self Defense Force 
(JGSDF) to 147,000 from 167,000 and redistribution from major concentrations in 
Hokkaido to a greater balance throughout all areas of Japan.  In addition, both the Japan 
Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) and Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) saw a 
reduction in active units.26  The emphasis of this revision, however, still was on a Cold 
War-type conflict.  
Japan’s greater role in international affairs continued to change with the 
publication of the 1997 revised Guidelines for Defense Cooperation between the United 
States and Japan.  This agreement detailed the types of assistance that Japan would 
provide in the event of a regional contingency, including rear area support, intelligence 
sharing, and bilateral planning.27  A new concept was introduced in the agreement that 
detailed cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (SIASJ), which allowed 
Japan to start looking farther away from the immediate vicinity of Japan to other 
geographic areas that could have an important influence on Japan's peace and security.  It 
also indicated Japan’s greater willingness to participate in regional security operations 
and contingencies, such as direct support to the United States during a Korean peninsula 
conflict. Finally, the new guidelines reinforced that any Self Defense Force operations 
would be conducted in strict accordance to constitutional limitations.28
The 1995 NDPO was augmented in December 2000 with the approval of the Mid-
Term Defense Program (MTDP) for FY 2001-2005. The new MTDP built on many of the 
 
25 Seong-Tae Hong, ed., The Strategic Balance in Northeast Asia, 2003 (Seoul: Korea Research 
Institute for Strategy, 2003), 146. 
26 Nihon Boueichou (Japan Defense Agency), “Defense of Japan 1991,” 246-247. 
27 Nihon Boueichou (Japan Defense Agency), “Defense of Japan 1991,” 279-286. 
28 Nihon Gaimushou (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs). “The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense 
Cooperation.” 1997. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html. 
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pre-existing initiatives, but it increased emphasis on protecting Japan from various forms 
of attacks, such as guerilla-commando raids, ballistic missile defense, evacuation of 
Japanese nationals overseas, intelligence, sustainability and survivability.29 The MTDP 
was, however, careful to not name any particular countries of concern and kept the source 
of threats thinly veiled. 
The greatest shift in Japanese security thinking occurred after the terrorist attacks 
on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. Japan reacted quickly to offer 
support to the United States and provided extensive security to U.S. military bases in 
Japan. Also, as it became obvious that the United States would be conducting strikes in 
Afghanistan, Japan offered logistics support to US forces. The attacks on the Pentagon 
and New York showed Japan that security could no longer be guaranteed by the United 
States. This realization was further emphasized in December 2001 when the Japanese 
Coast Guard intercepted a North Korean spy ship.  After the North Korean boat opened 
up with automatic fire and possibly with a rocket-propelled grenade, the spy ship was 
sunk.  
A greater emphasis on indigenous defense capability was soon called for across 
the spectrum of Japanese government. Comparing Japan’s stated goals from the end of 
the Cold War to those stated more recently shows just how far Japan has come in its 
security thinking.  In 1994, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Diplomatic 
Bluebook listed the main goals of Japan as to strengthen the functions of the United 
Nations and increase trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States and Europe.30 
By 2003 the MOFA Diplomatic Bluebook listed the primary goals of Japan as to firmly 
maintain the Japan-US Security Arrangements, moderately build up Japan’s defense 
capability on an appropriate scale and pursue diplomatic efforts to ensure international 
peace and security.31  Japan has also been more active in regional and global affairs 
following September 2001.  Security dialogues, such as the recent six–party talks to 
 
29 Nihon Boueichou (Japan Defense Agency). “Defense of Japan 2001 (Summary).” Defense Agency, 
2001. http://www.jda.go.jp/e/pab/wp2001/index.html (accessed December 2, 2004). 
30 Nihon Gaimushou (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs). “The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense 
Cooperation.” 
31 Nihon Gaimushou (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs). “2004 Diplomatic Bluebook.” 2004. 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/index.html (accessed December 16, 2004). 
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resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis and the 2003 Iraqi reconstruction meetings in 
Tokyo, have emphasized Japanese participation in security affairs.  These efforts have 
brought praise by many nations but also raised questions about what the desired role 
Japan should adopt in world affairs.  
E. THE ROAD AHEAD FOR JAPAN’S SECURITY POLICY 
The most recent controversy has involved approval of a new National Defense 
Program Outline32, Mid-Term Defense Review and the subsequent announcement by 
Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Hosoda Hiroyuki on the relaxation of Japan's arms 
exports ban to enable sales of missile defense components to the United States.33 The 
new outline reduces the authorized strength of the JGSDF to 155,000, a decrease of 5,000 
troops, and a further strengthening of the United States–Japan alliance.34  It places greater 
emphasis on creating a force able to respond to new threats such as terrorism and ballistic 
missile attacks.  The document also points to North Korea’s military moves as “a 
significantly unstable factor in regional security and a serious problem for global 
nonproliferation efforts.”35  The previous outline in 1995 had avoided referring to 
specific countries of concern by name.  In addition to the updated NDPO, the Cabinet 
also approved the next MTDP for fiscal years 2005-09 which among other things cut the 
five-year budget from ¥25.16 trillion to ¥24.24 trillion.36  
F. WHAT IS A “NORMAL” NATION? 
The Government of Japan has indicated its intention to continue the evolution of 
the military missions of the JSDF to create a viable international military force that can 
assist not only in peace keeping and eventually in peace enforcing but quite possibly even 
in peace making operations throughout the globe.   The underlying question has asked 
 
32 Although the name of the document has not changed in Japanese, the NDPO is now being referred 
to as the National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) in JDA publications.  For consistency, this paper 
will continue to use NDPO to refer to the document. 
33 Xinhuanet. “Japan Unveils Defense Program Outline, Eases Arms Export Ban.” December 10, 
2004. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-12/10/content_2317154.htm (accessed December 11, 2004). 
34 Nihon Boueichou (Japan Defense Agency), “Bouei Keikaku no Taiko (National Defense Program 
Outline),” (Tokyo: 2004). 
35 People's Daily Online. “Japan's New Defense Outline to be Effective from April 2005.” December 
10, 2004. http://english.people.com.cn/200412/10/eng20041210_166858.html (accessed December 11, 
2004). 
36 Nihon Boueichou (Japan Defense Agency), “Chuki Boueiryoku Seibi Keikaku (Mid-Term Defense 
Program Outline),” (Tokyo: 2004). 
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why Japan sees the need for such an international role.  Debate has gone much beyond 
the initial dialogue of the 1990s about whether Japan’s role was in bridging the gap 
between East and West or setting an example for both.  Instead, Japan as the second 
largest national economy in the world, sees itself increasingly in a regional and global 
leadership role.  Japan is actively seeking a permanent seat on the United Nations 
Security Council and as such sees the need for a more active role in security affairs.  This 
has led to greater concern by many nations about whether Japan can do so while 
maintaining a constitution that renounces the right to belligerency.    In order to address 
these concerns, Japan began to try to raise the international acceptance and standing of 
the JSDF through exercises and exchanges and the deployment of peacekeeping forces 
under a United Nations charter.  
G. CASE STUDIES  
In order to establish a consistent basis to assess reaction to changes in the Self 
Defense Force mission, six case studies will be examined in the next three chapters.  
They are: establishment of a ballistic missile defense; participation in counter terrorism 
operations in the Indian ocean; deployment of the JSDF to Iraq, participation in the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); disaster relief following the December 2004 
tsunami in South and Southeast Asia; and historical issues such as visits by Prime 
Minister Koizumi to Yasukuni Jinja (Yasukuni Shrine) and the publishing of 
controversial history textbooks. Each case study will be assessed according to the type of 
mission (stability or security) and the framework under which it is carried out (global, 
regional or national). These examples provide a sample of changes that have occurred 
over the last few years in order to demarcate trends.  They are not intended to be an all-
inclusive list of significant international events.  
1. Counter-terrorism Operations in the Indian Ocean 
The deployment of the Japanese forces overseas has been controversial since the 
publishing of a joint communiqué between the United States and Japan issued during the 
visit of Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru on September 1, 1955 that declared the 
principle of the “progressive withdrawal of American forces, contingent upon Japan 
becoming strong enough to contribute substantially to her own defense,” as well as 
15 
                                                
implying an eventual deployment of Japanese forces overseas.37 The debate intensified in 
the early 1990s over which forces were appropriate for Tokyo to send in support of 
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The criticism of Japan’s slow response with 
actual forces created a great debate, not only in Japan, but also the region. This debate 
slowly eroded with the deployment of JSDF troops to Cambodia in 1993 and subsequent 
participation in numerous global peacekeeping and disaster relief operations.  (See 
Appendix B) While these forces were assigned to provide basic humanitarian and 
security assistance, they were never involved, even indirectly, in major combat 
operations.  This taboo changed quickly following the terrorist attacks on the United 
States on September 11, 2001.  Japan’s pledge of the assistance of the JMSDF and 
JASDF to the United States in the war on terrorism broke new ground and resuscitated an 
old controversy about the JSDF—whether forces should be deployed overseas.  
Eventually the Cabinet approved and the Diet passed the Anti-Terrorism Special 
Measures Law.38 The law provided for support to the United States through supply, 
transportation, repair, maintenance, medical support and rear area support in Japan.39  
Even in the face of domestic and international criticism, the JMSDF deployed to the 
Indian Ocean to assist in logistics with U.S. and, later, coalition forces conducting 
operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan.   
Although Japan never participated directly in combat operation, its supply ships 
were directly supporting those vessels that did. This acceptance of a global responsibility 
to help maintain security has been met with a mixed response from nations in Asia.  A 
key distinction in this operation is that pursuit of the war in Afghanistan by the United 
States and a “coalition of the willing” had international legitimacy under United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1368.  The legality of Japan’s deployment in this 
instance, under the Japanese Constitution, however, has been extensively questioned.   
2. Iraqi Stability Operations 
The deployment to the Indian Ocean in support of a multi-national effort was not 
as controversial as the decision to deploy the JGSDF to Iraq to support stability 
 
37 Royama, “Problems in Self-Defense,” 172. 
38 In Japanese: テロ対策特別措置法 
39 Nihon Boueichou (Japan Defense Agency), “Defense of Japan 2003,” (Tokyo: Defense Agency, 
2003), 459. 
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operations with the United States–led coalition in December 2003. Although the JGSDF 
had deployed numerous forces overseas in support of United Nations–approved 
operations, this was the first deployment of ground forces outside such a framework.  On 
December 9, 2003, the Diet passed the “Law Concerning the Special Measures on 
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq.”40 This law limited the JSDF 
personnel only to carrying out the activities of humanitarian and reconstruction 
assistance, including medical services, water supply, rehabilitation and maintenance of 
utilities without the use force and only in those areas where combat is not taking place.  
In addition, forces are strictly mandated not to use their weapons, except in cases of self-
defense.41  As a result of the policy implementation the JGSDF, JMSDF and JASDF 
deployed personnel and equipment to areas around As Samawah, airport facilities in 
Basrah, Baghdad, Balad and Mosul, as well as the port facilities in Umm Qasr. Such a 
deployment in direct support of the United States was especially worrisome to some, as it 
indicated Japan’s willingness to follow the United States on issues not supported in the 
United Nations and even questionable under the current constitutional framework.  
Similar to the Indian Ocean deployments of the JSDF, deployments to Iraq are 
being conducted under a global framework.  Although diplomatic Japan’s support for the 
United States led war in Iraq may indicate this as a security related event, the government 
of Japan has been very careful to emphasize the stability aspect of this mission.  The 
JSDF is not deployed to an area of high threat and have been working to rebuild the local 
community.  The JSDF is not involved in counterinsurgency operations either actively or 
in support roles.  This matter is, however, complicated by questions about the legitimacy 
of the Iraq war in the first place.  The United States was not able to receive UNSC 
backing, and many European nations actively opposed the war.  Greater European 
involvement in post-conflict reconstruction is also providing more legitimacy to the 
current mission as a stability, rather than as a security mission. 
 
 
40 In Japanese: イラクにおける人道復興支援活動及び安全確保支援活動の実施に関する特別措置法 
41 Junichiro Koizumi. “The Outline of the Basic Plan regarding Response Measures Based on the Law 
Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq.” Nihon Kantei, 
December 9, 2003. http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2003/031209housin_e.html (accessed December 
28, 2004). 
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3. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
On May 31, 2003 President George W. Bush announced the formation of the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as part of a global effort to interdict shipments of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), delivery systems, and related materials. Although 
listed as an initiative, not an organization with membership, 11 countries formally 
adopted the PSI on September 4, 2003.42  The PSI differs from a more proactive counter-
proliferation strategy in that, in instances of suspected transport of contraband material, 
states are encouraged to: 
 Not transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes, and not to allow 
any personnel subject to their jurisdiction to do so.  
 Board and search any vessel flying their flag in their internal waters or 
territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial sea of any other state. 
 Provide consent to other nations to board and search any vessel flying their 
flag. 
 To stop and/or search in their internal waters, territorial seas, of contiguous 
zones (when declared) vessels that are reasonably suspect. 
 To require aircraft transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize any 
such cargoes that are identified.43 
Although not directly supported by the United Nations, Security Council 
Resolution 1540, adopted unanimously in April 2004, affirmed the “resolve to take 
appropriate and effective actions against any threat to international peace and security 
caused by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means 
of delivery…”44 Consistent with this and the above list, PSI interdictions are conducted 
only with government consent in territorial waters and, on the high seas, only with flag-
country approval.  The  first  PSI  exercise  was hosted by Australia in September 2003 in  
 
42 Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States 
43 United States Department of State. “The Proliferation Security Initiative.” Bureau of 
Nonproliferation, July 28, 2004. http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/other/34726.htm (accessed February 9, 
2005). 
44 United Nations. “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.” April 28, 2004. 
http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540/index.html (accessed February 9, 2005). 
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the Coral Sea with another exercise hosted by Japan in October 2004 that included 
observers from Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia, New Zealand and fourteen other 
nations.45  
Since inception, the list of nations that have signed on to the PSI has grown to 
over 60, including perhaps most significantly being Russia, which approved the 
framework on May 31, 2004 after the initial reservation that the PSI would enhance the 
U.S. ability to act unilaterally against Russian shipping.46 Although the PSI is a global 
initiative, Japanese involvement has specific regional security consequences, especially 
unambiguously with respects to about North Korea’s role as a WMD proliferator.  The 
counter-proliferation techniques adopted under the PSI are intended to increase security 
by curbing the spread of WMD components and precursors.   
4. Tsunami Relief 
Japan’s most recent support to regional stability operations followed the 
December 26, 2004 Aceh earthquake and tsunami that devastated large areas of 
Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka and India.  Tokyo was quick to pledge economic 
assistance as well as dispatch the JSDF to the area to assist in relief operations.  While 
this dispatch appeared on the surface to be similar to other deployments for disaster 
relief, such as to East Timor, there is a significant change in the command and control 
structure of this operation.  Prior to this disaster, the largest dispatch of forces for 
humanitarian relief was 400 JSDF personnel dispatched to Turkey in 1999.47  The total 
number of JSDF personnel engaged in disaster relief activities in Indonesia is 
approximately 970, with approximately 230 personnel from the JGSDF, approximately 
640 personnel from the JMSDF, approximately 90 personnel from the JASDF and 
another 20 personnel from the Joint Staff Office (JSO).48  More importantly the JMSDF 
 
45 Economist.com. “No Place to Hide, Maybe.” From the Economist Print Edition, October 28, 2004. 
http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=3336512 (accessed December 10, 2004). 
46 This likely brings up memories of the United States’ seizure of the Russian flagged tanker 
Volgoneft-147 for violating Iraqi sanctions by U.S. Naval Forces in the Arabian Gulf in February 2000 that 
caused extreme embarrassment for the Russian government.    
47 Brad Glosserman. “Japan Seizes the Moment.” The Japan Times Online, January 17, 2005. 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/geted.pl5?eo20050117bg.htm (accessed February 8, 2005). 
48 Embassy of Japan to Indonesia. “Disaster Relief Activities by Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) in 
Indonesia.” January 23, 2005. http://www.id.emb-japan.go.jp/news05_11e.html (accessed February 8, 
2005). 
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deployed the amphibious ship Kunisaki, destroyer Kurama and fast supply ship Tokiwa to 
the Bander Aceh region.  This has allowed the Kunisaki to be used as a command and 
control platform from which JGSDF helicopters and personnel deploy every morning, 
returning to the ship at the end of the day.49   
This situation is being used as a test case for the creation of a Joint Command 
structure similar to the United States’ Joint task Force (JTF).  Currently the JSO holds a 
coordinating, not command, position with regard to the services.  As Japan increases its 
overseas presence, a more efficient command structure will need to be utilized.  Hence, 
what appears to be a simple disaster relief operation is in actuality the test case for a 
radically new operational doctrine for the JSDF. 
5. Ballistic Missile Defense 
Following the launch of a Taepo Dong ballistic missile over Japan by North 
Korea in August 1998, Japan began to push forward on the development and deployment 
of a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system. The formal decision to join in the United 
States Navy Theater Wide Defense System (NTWD) was made by the Cabinet on 
December 25, 1998,50 although Japan had initially signed on to assist in research of the 
U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) during the Reagan administration51 and had 
allocated substantial funds for research and development of some capabilities since that 
time. The initial decision to develop a missile defense system likely came about in April 
2003, following North Korea’s official withdrawal from the NPT.52  While rumor and 
speculation continued through the summer, the exact extent of this program was officially 
announced on December 19, 2003 when the Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo 
announced the intent to develop a new NDPO that increase funding for the research, 
development and deployment of a BMD system.53  When the NDPO was unveiled in 
 
49 Keibun Goto. “Just Shipshape: All Aboard.” Asahi Shimbun, February 5, 2005. 
http://www.asahi.com/english/world/TKY200502050172.html (accessed February 10, 2005). 
50 Nihon Boueichou (Japan Defense Agency), “Defense of Japan 2003,” 454. 
51 Tsuneo Akaha, “Japan's Comprehensive Security Policy,” Asian Survey 31, no. 4 (1991): 325. 
52 Victor D. Cha. “"Containment Lite".” In Comparative Connections, Pacific Forum CSIS, 2nd 
Quarter 2003. http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0302Qjapan_skorea.html (accessed February 19, 2005). 
53 Yasuo Fukuda. “Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Japan's Preparedness to Respond to 
National Emergencies.” Nihon Kantei, December 19, 2003. 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyokan/2003/1219danwa_e.html (accessed January 5, 2005). 
December 2004, Secretary Fukuda also announced the relaxation of Japan’s “Three 
Principles of Arms Exports” to allow for joint research and development exclusively with 
the United States “under the condition that strict control is maintained.54
North Korea’s Taepo Dong missile is not Japan’s only justification for 
establishing a missile defense system.  While North Korea’s No Dong 1 & 2 missiles are 
also able to range Japan, Tokyo is increasingly wary of China’s ballistic missile 
capabilities.  Although it is unlikely that China could directly threaten the Japanese 
mainland in the event of a regional conflict, Chinese DF-21, DF-25 and DF-3 missiles 
can range Japan in its entirety. (Figure 1) 
 
Figure 1.   North Korean and Chinese Ballistic Missiles Capable of Reaching Japan55 
                                                 
54 The Three Principles of Arms Exports states that no exports shall not be permitted to communist 
bloc countries, countries subject to "arms" exports embargo under the United Nations Security Council's 
resolutions, or countries involved in or likely to be involved in international conflicts. See Yasuo Fukuda. 
“Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on the Approval of the National Defense Program Guideline, 
FY2005-.” Nihon Boueichou, December 10, 2004. 
http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/taikou05/e02_01.htm (accessed February 10, 2005). 
55 From: Michael D. Swaine, Rachel M. Swanger, and Takashi Kawakami, Japan and Ballistic Missile 
Defense: The Case of Japan (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 17. 
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Joint research and deployment with the United States will, however, also mean 
some level of integration of Japan’s TMD system into the United States’ controversial 
National Missile Defense (NMD) system. This has invoked much criticism over Japan’s 
self imposed rejection of “collective self-defense.”56 Collective self-defense differs from 
individual self-defense in that: 
…the term "individual right of self-defense" refers to the right of a country 
which is directly attacked (Japan) to repel such attack, and the     term 
"right of collective self-defense" refers to the right of Japan, in a case 
where Japan does not itself undergo direct attack, to deem an attack 
against another country that is in an alliance with Japan (e.g. the United 
States) as an attack on itself and then counterattack.57
Japan’s motivations for creating the system under a national security framework 
has been extremely controversial in the region, yet Japan views such a system as purely 
defensive in nature, posing no threat to neighboring countries. The BMD system is 
actually intended to protect Japan from attack by only a small number of short–to 
medium–range ballistic missiles. Secretary Fukuda also addressed the issue of collective 
self-defense by claiming that the BMD system “will be operated based on Japan's 
independent judgment, and will not be used for the purpose of defending third 
countries”––a move clearly intended to appease Chinese fears of an integrated system 
with Taiwan.58  
6. Japan’s Historical Issues 
While every country in Asia has unique historical issues with Japan to overcome, 
such as resolution of acts committed by Japanese troops in World War II or in some cases 
disputes over islands claimed by both countries, two historical issues are common to all 
countries in Northeast Asia: visits by Japanese lawmakers to Yasukuni Jinja (lit. 
“peaceful-country shrine”) and perceived attempts by the Japanese government to cover 
 
56 The issue of collective self-defense is not explicitly stated in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, 
but is instead derived from a 1960 interpretation of Article 9. Riichi Furugaki. “Collective Self-Defense for 
Japan.” In Japan Watch, Pacific Forum CSIS, May 2000. 
http://www.csis.org/japan/japanwatch/jw000501.pdf (accessed January 30, 2005).  
57 Katsuo Sorimachi. “Legal Basis for Japan's Ability to Exercise the Right of Collective Self-
Defense.” In 21st Century Shape of Japan Series, Tokyo Legal Mind, K.K., February 2001. http://www.lec-
jp.com/speaks/info_001.html (accessed February 11, 2005). 
58 Fukuda. “Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Japan's Preparedness to Respond to National 
Emergencies.” 
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up its activities during World War II.  These historical issues, while not directly pertinent 
to the JSDF, have had a great effect on Japan’s defense policy. These issues have 
significant capability to affect the stability of the region and are seen as Japanese attempts 
to revive its nationalist tendencies.    
On August 13, 2001, only four month after taking office, Prime Minister Koizumi 
set off a storm of controversy when he conducted a visit to the Yasukuni Jinja. Initially 
Koizumi had announced his intention to visit the shrine on August 15th to commemorate 
the end of World War II.  This date was particularly offensive to China and Korea as, in 
their view, it marks their liberation from Japanese occupation.  Although the shrine is 
often pointed to as a fabrication of Japan’s imperial past, the history of Yasukuni Jinja 
actually began in June 1869, when the Emperor Meiji decreed that a shrine be built to 
honor the sacrifice of those that died during the Boshin Civil War.  The shrine built in 
Tokyo’s Kudanshita ward was originally named Tokyo Shokonsha (shrine for inviting 
the Spirits). In 1879, Tokyo Shokonsha was renamed Yasukuni Jinja.  Inside are 
enshrined as kami (deities) all those who gave their lives in the service of Japan.  Initially 
this included 3,500 hashira59 (lit. pillar) from the Boshin Civil War, and the Saga and 
Satsuma Rebellions.  Eventually 2,466,532 hashira were enshrined in Yasukuni Jinja, 
including 1,068 convicted war criminals from World War II, of which 14 were classified 
as Class A war criminals.60 It is a Shinto belief that the sins of the living are removed 
following death, and therefore a visit to the shrine merely honors the sacrifice of nearly 
2.5 million war dead, and does not constitute approval of the actions of a small 
percentage of those enshrined.  Nonetheless, visits by Prime Minister Koizumi and other 
lawmakers have inflamed regional opinion of Japan as a sign of growing militarism.  This 
is exacerbated by the control of Yasukuni Jinja by right-wing elements who refer to the 
convicted war criminals as “martyrs of Showa.”  
Similar to visits to Yasukuni Jinja is the controversy over the government’s 
approval of publishing controversial history textbooks for use in Japanese middle 
schools.  While the history of Japanese censorship of textbooks started prior to World 
 
59 When referring to the number of souls enshrined it is appropriate to refer to them as hashira vice 
kami. 
60 Yasukuni Jinja. “History of Yasukuni Jinja.” February 1, 2005. http://www.yasukuni.or.jp/english/ 
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War II, the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers (SCAP) instituted the modern 
practice in 1946 as an effort to “ensure that textbooks did not encourage emperor-worship 
and militarism.”61  The current system involves Japanese textbook publishers submitting 
draft copies to the Ministry of Education for approval, which then makes a short list of 
books available to local schools for selection and use.  Review and recommendation of 
textbooks is an extremely opaque process, and until 1990 the feedback process from the 
Ministry to textbook publishers was exclusively oral. The current process of feedback is 
not much better, as it involves generic standardized language that requires “unofficial” 
clarification from Ministry officials.62
Japanese censorship became an international issue in 1982 when the Ministry 
ordered historian Ienaga Saburo to change text in his book, which was deemed as too 
critical of Japanese history.  International pressure resulted in the Ministry retracting its 
comments.63  This controversy was revived in April 2001 when The New History 
Textbook, a book written by the rightist Japanese Institute for New History Education, 
was approved for use in junior high schools.  This book, although eventually never used 
by any state or municipal public junior high school, met with strong protest in China, the 
Koreas, and Japan itself.  It also caused the cancellation or postponement of many 
security exchanges. Additional concern was raised in January 2005 when the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) approved a draft reform to the basic law on education to include 
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The concern expressed over the Japanese textbooks deals not only with what is 
written or omitted from the books, but also the way in which it is written.  When 
examined linguistically, the patterns in the textbooks can be extrapolated into three 
categories: 
The first process, termed ‘replacement’, refers to the use of certain lexical 
items, such as “shinshitsu” (‘advance’), instead of other similar items, like 
“shinryaku (‘invade’), that contain very different nuances. The second 
process, ‘redefinition’, highlights the use of language that alters the very 
definition of an item or an event, for example redefining Japan’s role in 
World War II as participating in a war of liberation rather than a war of 
aggression. The third process, ‘deletion’ refers to the repression of lexical 
descriptors; one example is the non-usage of the term ‘jugun ianfu’ 
(“military sex slaves” or “comfort women”) in all of the textbooks.65  
Examination of these linguistic processes reveals a greater danger of the 
systematic development of an “ideology of irresponsibility and face-protection.”66 This is 
further compounded by an educational system in Japan that stresses rote memorization 
over critical thinking.  Students, and teachers, spend their time preparing for standardized 
college entrance exams known as shiken jikoku (examination hell), instead of debating 
the role Japan played in the “Pacific War.”67  The combination of strict government 
control and a lack of critical thinking in schools has led students to implicitly trust the 
history textbooks as being the “full truth.”  
The Japanese approval of controversial textbooks is seen in the region as only a 
small part of a concerted effort by Japan to absolve responsibility for past aggression.  
Both the Yasukuni Jinja controversy and the rewriting of history textbooks have 
increased concern in the region that the Government of Japan is leading a concerted effort 
to forget its past misdeeds and once again follow a militarist path.  In addition, slow 
resolution of bilateral historical issues (e.g. territorial claims) have further increased 
distrust of Japan by its neighbors. 
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III. NORTH KOREAN REACTIONS TO EXPANDING THE JSDF  
Japan and North Korea have yet to normalize relations.  Efforts to do this began in 
earnest in 1990 with the visit of former Deputy Prime Minister Kanemaru Shin to 
Pyongyang.68  What followed was a series of unsuccessful talks in which the Japanese 
side wished to limit North Korea’s jurisdiction for compensation purposes to the 38th 
parallel and asserted the validity of the 1910 treaty of annexation of Korea and the 1954 
San Francisco peace treaty.69  The North Koreans, for their part, demanded 
“compensations for Japan’s colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula until 1945, war 
reparations and compensations, payment for the losses Japan caused North Korea by 
recognizing the South in 1965, and damages for what North Korea called Japan’s 
complicity in the Korean War.”70 Even while normalization talks were ongoing, Japan 
was providing significant humanitarian aid to North Korea.  The launch of a Taepo Dong 
ballistic missile over Japan on August 31, 1998 caused Japan to temporarily impose 
sanctions and suspended humanitarian assistance. Although Japan has often worked to 
resolve differences with North Korea, issues such as the ongoing nuclear crisis and the 
Japanese views of a half-hearted attempt by North Korea to address the issue of Japanese 
abducted by North Korean agents has brought normalization talks to a virtual standstill. 
The recent passage of the NDPO and accompanying MTDP in December 2004 
can be seen as a direct response to recent North Korean attempts at brinkmanship and the 
possibility of armed infiltrators conducting attacks in Japan in the event of a crisis. A 
recent Asahi Shimbun article explicitly raised the possibility of “armed agents from North 
Korea spilling into Japan during a military crisis on the Korean Peninsula.”71  Such a 
scenario likely played a major factor in development of both the NDPO and plans for the 
future force structure of the JSDF. 
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A. NORTH KOREA AND JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS 
A major impetus for change in the mid-1990s in the role of the JSDF in 
maintaining stability in the region came from relations with North Korea, yet Japan’s 
security relations have often also been dictated by the needs and desires of other nations, 
most importantly of the United States. The built-in mechanism for the coordination of 
security issues regarding North Korea originated from the Cold War framework in which 
the United States dictated the policy of containment against the Soviet-camp. With the 
end of the Cold War, the United States in many ways sustained a continuation of this 
framework.  Japan, for its part since the 1991 Gulf War crisis, has more actively 
participated in maintaining “a stable and peaceful international environment favorable to 
its peace and prosperity,” yet concurrently maintained the basic reliance on the United 
States.72  This dual hedge approach has led many to believe that “when in danger, Japan 
reverts to its alliance [with the United States] that has protected it for more than half a 
century.”73  While this may seem true when one compares Japan’s strategy for 
engagement in North Korea to the United States, Japan has shown that it is willing to 
break out on its own when its interests are at stake.   
A recent example of this was the visit by Prime Minister Koizumi to Pyongyang 
in September 2002 to discuss various security issues and the possibility of a resumption 
of normalization talks, a move not well received in Washington.  The outcome of these 
talks was the 2002 “Pyongyang Declaration,” which incorporated personal apologies both 
from Prime Minister Koizumi regarding Japan’s historical treatment of Korea and from 
Kim Jong-Il on North Korea’s abduction of Japanese citizens.  In addition it resolved to 
work together to resolve compensation issues, to maintain peace and stability in the 
region and to quickly resume normalization talks.  North Korea for its part also vowed to 
extend its moratorium on missile launches beyond 2003.74  Although the declaration is 
technically still in effect, both sides have often pointed to the other as violating both the 
letter and the spirit of the declaration. 
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There are, however, some issues over which Japan maintains a policy strictly in 
line with the United States.  Most important among these is the U.S. policy toward North 
Korea of “complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of all of its nuclear 
program.” Japan has endorsed its own version, comprised of four main points: 
 North Korea must freeze all nuclear programs including uranium enrichment 
programs; 
 North Korea must disclose information on all of its nuclear programs; 
 This freeze must entail efficient verification; and 
 Japan is ready to contribute to international energy assistance for North Korea 
only if these conditions are satisfied and if this freeze is a part of an agreement 
to dismantle North Korea's nuclear programs.75 
This policy, while a mirror of the U.S. policy, is also an outgrowth of Japan’s 
stance during the 1994 nuclear crisis, when North Korean brinkmanship forced the 
United States to directly threaten the use of force to halt the reprocessing of nuclear fuel 
rods at the Yongbyon nuclear reactor.  In Japan, the threat of a war on its doorstep was 
cause for concern, more out of the belief that Japan would be dragged into another 
“American war” than due to a true concern for the safety of Japan. Repeated calls to turn 
Seoul into a “sea of fire” began to increase recognition that Japan could be vulnerable to 
an attack from North Korea.76  This false sense of security was shattered in August of 
1998 with the North Korea Taepo Dong missile launch. The Japanese public realized that 
it was vulnerable to an attack from North Korea.  Public paranoia of North Korea grew, 
with increased attention being given to numerous reports of North Korean spy ships, 
disguised as fishing boats operating off of Japan and rumors of drug deliveries, 
infiltration attempts by North Korean agents and even kidnappings of Japanese citizens.  
In March 1999, two North Korean “fishing boats” out-ran Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) 
ships in the Sea of Japan at speeds in excess of 35 knots––a speed not conducive to 
fishing––further fueling Japanese concerns of North Korea’s intentions. 
Japan’s experiences with North Korea during the 1990s heavily influenced the 
drafting of the December 2000 Mid-Term Defense Program for FY 2001-2005. While 
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stopping short of naming North Korea as a belligerent nation, it increased emphasis on 
protecting Japan from various forms of attacks such as guerilla-commando attacks, 
ballistic missile defense, evacuation of Japanese nationals overseas, intelligence, 
sustainability and survivability, all of which are thinly veiled references to North 
Korea.77 The increased vigilance against North Korea paid off in December 2001 when 
the JCG intercepted another mothership south of Kyushu.  The JCG vessel pursued the 
North Korean mothership and attempted to disable and board it.  When the vessel opened 
fire on the JCG ship with small arms and probably with a rocket propelled grenade, the 
JCG sank it with no survivors, a move the North Korean government called “nothing but 
the brutal piracy and unpardonable terrorism of a modern band that could only be 
committed by samurais of Japan in defiance of international laws.”78
Japanese–North Korean relations have not always been negative, and there are 
some issues that at times appeared to even be improving.  Kim Jong-Il’s admission and 
apology during the September 2002 meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi regarding the 
abduction of Japanese citizens took Japan by surprise and indicated a possibility that 
relations between the countries could improve.  This issue was, however, seized upon by 
the Japanese press, which turned it into continuing drama, complete with separated 
families, a United States Army deserter, and literally hundreds of unsolved 
disappearances being attributed to possible North Korean agents.  Prior to North Korea’s 
admission, claims of abduction by North Korean agents were dismissed much as claims 
of “alien abductions” are in the United States.  This revelation helped to create in Japan a 
“civic-societal ‘mood’ (if not movement) highly antagonistic toward North Korea.”79  
North Korea further fueled animosity on January 10, 2003 when it announced that 
it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, effective April 10, 2003.  
In addition, North Korea’s chief negotiator Kim Yong-Il revealed that North Korea had 
developed nuclear weapons, and declared “if the U.S. persists in its moves to apply 
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pressure and stifle the DPRK by force, the latter will have no option but to take a tougher 
counteraction.”80  This revelation and hard-line approach by North Korea created calls to 
accelerate Japan’s military modernization efforts and created cover for the adopting of 
what might otherwise have been considered extremely controversial government 
legislation.  Citing the North Korea threat, Japan continued with an expansion of its 
intelligence collection capabilities, moved to acquire more advanced PAC-3 Patriot 
missiles, and placed JMSDF ships on alert in the Sea of Japan.81 Director General of the 
Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Ishiba Shigeru even called for much more controversial 
systems such as the acquisition of Tomahawk cruise missiles, an offensive system that 
Japan has traditionally denounced, and a general build up in the JSDF.82  
While Prime Minister Koizumi has often advocated the need to further engage 
North Korea in resolving both the current nuclear crisis and other outstanding security 
concerns, he has also further pushed to strengthen his position vis-à-vis North Korea.  
This includes revision to the foreign exchange law passed on January 29, 2004 in the 
Lower House of the Diet that would enable Japan to unilaterally impose economic 
sanctions against North Korea.83 Although North Korea was not explicitly named in the 
legislation, the understanding of its applicability to the current situation was once again 
clear.84  North Korea was, however, explicitly named in the joint statement with the 
United States at the February 20, 2005 “2+2” meeting in Washington.  The statement 
declared that North Korea’s nuclear ambitions “represents a direct threat to the peace and 
stability”  in  Asia,  a  move  North  Korea  has  denounced  as  a  “vicious hostile policy”  
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leading to Japan’s invasion of the Korean peninsula and the reestablishment of the 
“Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.”85 While such an invasion is unlikely, 
Japanese-North Korean relations remain problematic.   
B. NORTH KOREAN DIPLOMATIC AND SECURITY OPTIONS 
Due to North Korea’s isolation from the international community and struggling 
economy, there are only a limited number of options that North Korea has to express its 
concerns about Japanese policies and actions.  Because Japan and North Korea do not 
have formal relations, many of the traditional instruments of diplomacy are not available 
to North Korea.  In addition, North Korean trade with Japan makes up only a very small 
amount of Japan’s total trade (see Appendix C).  North Korea is economically more 
reliant on Japan than Japan is on it. 
Therefore, in order to influence Japanese decision-making, North Korea has only 
four means, none of which are very effective, to pressure the Japanese government.  First 
among these are statements expressed by government officials and published through the 
Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).  North Korea’s controlled press is extremely 
colorful and often very negative about Japan.  Therefore, unlike statements made by 
South Korean or Chinese officials, negative North Korean statements are the norm and 
have little impact on Japanese decision-making.  A second means is pressure placed on 
the government of Japan through the over 500,000 Korean nationals living in Japan.  
While pro-North Korean organizations such as Chosen Soren (General Association of 
Korean Residents in Japan) still boast memberships as high as 200,000, active 
participation has decreased yearly since the transfer of power in North Korea from Kim 
Il-Sung to his son, Kim Jung-Il. This organization, which absent an official embassy has 
traditionally represented North Korea’s interests in Tokyo, is now less able to apply 
pressure on the Japanese government.  A third option for North Korea is what has been 
referred to as “brinkmanship.”  North Korea’s repeated efforts to develop nuclear 
weapons and test-launch ballistic missiles have been means by which North Korea has 
sought concessions or aid from Japan and the United States.  The current Bush and 
Koizumi administrations’ unwillingness to “reward North Korea for its bad behavior” has 
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reduced the effectiveness of this negotiating tactic and has actually resulted in an anti-
North Korea backlash in Japan.  The final option for North Korea is the very process of 
reestablishing normal relations with Japan.  Since the 1990s Japan has been eager to 
improve relations with North Korea, seeing the reestablishment of diplomatic relations as 
the first step in ensuring the peace and stability of the region.  This issue has been 
repeatedly hijacked by rightist elements in Japan, making consistent pressure by North 
Korea difficult to sustain.  North Korea’s efforts to influence Japan’s policy can be seen 
in more detail by examining the six case studies below. 
C. COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN 
North Korean reaction to the JSDF deployment to the Indian Ocean was mostly 
muted, although the KCNA did label Japan’s justification for supporting the Afghanistan 
operations as “brigandish sophistry that can be used only by the Japanese militarists who 
consider aggression and war for overseas expansion as means for their existence.”86  This 
toned-down response was not due to any level of acceptance by North Korea, but instead 
due to other issues of greater concern to North Korea that took precedence. At the same 
time that the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures law was being passed, Japanese relations 
with North Korea were being strained over an investigation of the May 1999 bankruptcy 
of the Chogin Tokyo Credit Union, which indicated that senior members of Chosen Soren 
had illegally funneled a large amount of the bank’s funds to North Korea.  This 
investigation led to an eventual police raid on the headquarters of Chosen Soren, a move 
North Korea “almost certainly interpreted as an affront to its sovereignty.”87   
In addition, North Korea was becoming increasingly nervous that U.S. calls to 
end global terrorism would mean regime change in North Korea.  These concerns were 
increased by Japan’s apparent willingness to follow the United States in its endeavors, 
regardless of whether they break from Japan’s post-war nonbelligerent past.  These fears 
were further amplified in January 2002 when President George W. Bush labeled North 
Korea part of an “axis of evil.”  North Korea’s attempts to return to the negotiating table 
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so quickly after the dispatch of the JSDF overseas indicates that North Korean intentions 
are based more on short-term gains and immediate security concerns, than any long-term 
goals, such as the normalization of relations.  Therefore, it is likely that changes in the 
JSDF’s security missions or capabilities that do not directly affect North Korea are not 
likely to draw strong criticisms in the future.  The fact that the deployments were outside 
of Northeast Asia likely helped to dampen North Korea’s reaction. 
D. IRAQI STABILITY OPERATIONS 
Similar to the JSDF deployment to the Indian Ocean, the North Korean response 
to the Iraqi deployment was relatively benign.  While Pyongyang remains concerned 
about an apparent resurgence of militarism in Japan, the ongoing issues surrounding the 
nuclear crisis and the return of Japanese abductees and their family members 
monopolized most of the discussions between Japan and North Korea in late 2003 and 
early 2004.  In addition, the dispatch of more than 3,000 South Korean troops and Japan’s 
strict adherence to humanitarian assistance and reconstruction (instead of 
counterinsurgency) operations undermined much of North Korea’s argument of the 
deployment being another sign of Japan’s growing militarism. 
E. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI) 
Pyongyang views the PSI as a direct effort to isolate the North Korean regime and 
cut off a ‘legitimate’ source of income for the government.  This is likely a true 
impression, as one of the major motivations for establishment of the PSI initiative was a 
lack of international legal precedence to seize a shipment of SCUD missiles en route 
Yemen from North Korea by the Spanish Navy in the Arabian Sea in December 2002.88 
Since the announcement of the PSI in May 2003, Pyongynag has warned all nations 
against violating the sovereignty of North Korean ships and aircraft.  
The PSI principles were put to the test for the first time in the Pacific on August 
13, 2003 when the North Korean cargo ship Be Gae Hung was detained in Kaoshiung, 
Taiwan and 158 barrels of the chemical weapons precursor, phosphorus pentasulfide, was 
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seized following tips from U.S. intelligence officials.89  The ship had stopped in 
Kaoshiung in order to offload various chemicals from Thailand, before returning to North 
Korea.  Taiwanese officials indicated that the chemical was a controlled substance and 
the North Korea was obligated to declare it before entering port.  Since the ship had not 
done so Taiwanese officials seized the shipment of chemicals.  On August 21, 2003, 
approximately one week after the seizure of the Be Gae Hung, a North Korean Land and 
Maritime Transport Ministry spokesman condemned Taiwan’s action, labeling it “a 
criminal act in wanton violation of international law … and an intolerable infringement 
upon the sovereignty of the DPRK.”90 Unlike the December 2002 SCUD missile crisis, 
this issue quickly died in preparation for the commencement of the Six-Party Talks on 
August 27, 2003.   
North Korean reaction to the PSI remained limited until the announcement in 
March 2004 that Japan would host a PSI exercise in the fall.  North Korea once again 
warned against any violation of its sovereignty and warned of “powerful retaliation” if 
Japan interfered in North Korean affairs.91  Japan hosted the PSI exercise in October 
2004 with the United States, Australia and France participating and observers from 
Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia, New Zealand and fourteen other nations.92  The 
North Korean response was as expected, calling the participation in the exercise a clear 
violation of the 2002 Pyongyang Declaration.93  While the October 2004 PSI exercise 
likely influenced Pyongyang’s decision to withdraw from the six-party talks, it is more 
likely that the November 2004 U.S. presidential elections played more heavily into North 
Korea’s decision to delay talks.   
While North Korea has been relatively unhappy with Japanese participation in the 
PSI, the wide range of countries that have signed on, including most importantly Russia 
in May 2004, has caused North Korea to tone down its anti–Japanese rhetoric on this 
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scope.  Most of North Korea’s focus is instead aimed at the United States as the de facto 
leader and originator of the PSI.  Japan, although a founding nation in the initiative, is 
relegated to a second-string role in PSI criticisms.  By analyzing North Korea’s reaction 
to Japanese involvement in PSI, it can be surmised that Japanese participation in 
operations that include a wide range of general support from the international community 
can help to deflect North Korean criticisms of Japanese military activities and exercises.  
Although the PSI is a global initiative, it does have specific regional security 
consequences when North Korea’s proliferation history and the geographic extent of 
Japanese participation are considered.  Therefore, it is likely that Japan can safely expand 
its regional security mission with only minor consequences from North Korea in cases 
that involve global or at a minimum extensive regional support.  
F. TSUNAMI RELIEF 
Japan’s efforts to lead an East Asian response for tsunami relief have led to no 
response from the North Korean government.  While not directly recognizing Japan’s 
involvement in disaster relief operations and humanitarian assistance, North Korea did 
pledge $150,000 in aid to victims of the tsunami only days after Japan’s pledge of $500 
million.  North Korea has traditionally welcomed Japanese efforts at providing 
humanitarian assistance, especially when it is the recipient.  Using the tsunami relief 
mission as an example for future operations, it is unlikely that North Korea would 
actively oppose an extension of the JSDF’s mission to better provide disaster relief or 
humanitarian assistance even if such a move increased Japan’s military capability. 
G. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
Japan’s decision to build a missile defense system in April 2003 came 
immediately on the heels of North Korea’s official withdrawal from the NPT.  Japan’s 
announcement later that year brought veiled threats from North Korea, declaring it as part 
of a “preemptive war strategy.”94 But once again, North Korea’s observable reaction 
were minimal, as relations had already stalled over a return to negotiations over the 
nuclear crisis and the Japanese demands at resolving the abduction issue.  Speculation on 
a new round of No Dong MRBM tests and rhetoric aimed at Tokyo threatening to turn it 
into a “sea of fire” in September 2004 caused Japan to once again elevate the presence of 
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the AEGIS equipped JMSDF destroyers in the Sea of Japan.  North Korea responded 
later that month that the deployment of missile defense ships in the Sea of Japan was an 
attempt by Japan to “isolate and crush” North Korea.95  
Due to the nature of the simultaneous crises occurring involving North Korea at 
the time of Tokyo’s announcement it is difficult to identify a direct North Korean 
response to Japan’s missile defense system, however North Korean “saber rattling” is a 
clear indicator of North Korea’s concerns over the deployment of such a system.  North 
Korea sees the nuclear and missile issues as one of their few tools available to negotiate 
with the United States and Japan.  This can be inferred from North Korea’s statement of 
withdrawal from the NPT, in which it rationalized that it was in “a dangerous situation 
where our nation's sovereignty and our state's security are being seriously violated…due 
to the U.S. vicious hostile policy towards the DPRK.”96 By withdrawing from the treaty 
and removing the international legal obligations, North Korea was in a better position to 
“obtain meaningful security guarantees from Washington.”97
Japan’s pledge to assist the United States in the research and development of a 
missile defense system, combined with Japan’s support for the United States’ 
“preemptive” (or preventive) war policy, has the potential to back North Korea into a 
corner without the full ability to use what has traditionally been an effective negotiating 
technique.  This runs the risk of creating a downward spiral between North Korea and 
Japan in which each side reacts to the development and deployment of new systems by 
the other without a concerted effort to improve relations.   
H. RESOLUTION OF HISTORICAL ISSUES 
Japanese and North Korean attempts to address kako no seisan (settlement of the 
past) is the single case study presented in this chapter that Japan can deal bilaterally with 
North Korea.  Yet this issue has emerged as one of the greatest barriers to a normalization 
of relations between the two countries and frequently emerges as an issue at multilateral 
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dialogues, such as the six-party talks.98  What truly sets these issues apart with respects to 
North Korea, however, is that fact that historical issues run in both directions.  While 
North Korea’s press almost daily calls for Japan to properly address historical issues such 
as the Japanese use of Korean comfort women during World War II (an issue North 
Korea claims monetary compensation for), the Japanese press has often focused on the 
issue of Japanese nationals abducted by North Korean agents (an issue of national pride 
in Japan).  While visits by Prime Minister Koizumi to Yasukuni Jinja have upset the 
North Korean government, it does not receive the level of near-daily press exposure in 
North Korea as the other historical issues since normalization talks broke down in late 
2002.  Perhaps not so coincidentally, visits to Yasukuni Jinja are not an issue for which 
North Korea claims monetary compensation.   
Disagreements over historical issues will continue in the near term until Japan is 
convinced of North Korea’s attempts to resolve the status of the remaining abductees, and 
an apology complete with an economic aid package is settled on that both North Korea 
and Japan agree upon.  Needless to say, this will not likely occur in the near term.  A 
major concern in both Washington and Tokyo regarding any financial assistance that 
Japan may provide as a form of compensation or reparations is that it would be large 
enough to “sustain the Kim Jong-Il regime without inducing any behavioral changes.”99  
Therefore it is very likely that historical issues, not security relations, will continue to be 
the greatest obstacle to the normalization of relations and the development of a peaceful 
region. 
I. SUMMARY 
By looking at past changes in expansion of JSDF capabilities, a strong reactive 
correlation to actions by North Korea is observed, from calls to the development of a 
missile defense system following the 1998 launch of a Taepo Dong missile over Japan to 
the renewed emphasis on security brought about by fears posed by North Korean agents.  
Unfortunately, such moves continue to reveal Japan’s use of a reactive defense policy 
with regards to North Korea.  Although North Korea has not reacted directly to many 
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changes by the JSDF, it is unclear whether Tokyo’s consideration how to expand the 
mission or capabilities of the JSDF will further drive changes in Pyongyang’s attitude 
toward Japan.  These circumstances run the risk of creating a downward spiral of action-
reaction.  That being said, development and deployment of a functioning missile defense 
system and a strengthening of the JSDF’s defensive capabilities could provide additional 
leverage for Tokyo when negotiating with North Korea, making Japan’s decision a 
gamble with great potential rewards and consequences.  
 
 Global Regional National 
Case Study Afghanistan PSI Missile Defense Security 
Oriented 
Activities Reaction Rhetoric Sovereignty concerns 
Attempt at 
isolation 
Case Study Iraq Tsunami Relief Historical Issues Stability 
Oriented 
Activities Reaction Rhetoric None Suspended talks 
Table 1. North Korean Perceptions of Japanese Stability and Security Activities 
 
While it is unlikely that relations between Japan and North Korea will (or for that 
fact can) significantly worsen, it is evident from the preceding case studies, summarized 
in the above table, that national actions by Japan are seen as threatening to North Korea.  
This being said, it is unlikely that there will be any major obstacles from North Korea to 
initiatives to expand the scope and capability of the Japan Self Defense Forces under 
global or regional frameworks.  It is also evident from the case studies that North Korea 
is more open to changes that involve stability activities than to those that directly impact 
the JSDF’s security missions.  While North Korea’s reaction was negative to both 
nationalist case studies, Japanese efforts at deploying a missile defense have met with 
increased North Korean “saber rattling,” as opposed to a temporary suspension of talks.  
As Japan further expands the mission and increases the capability of the JSDF, it 
must be prepared to deal with issues of how North Korea will perceive these moves. 
North Korea already perceives Japan as actively isolating it from not only the global 
economy, but also working with the United States to isolate North Korea from South 
38 
Korea.  In the North Korean perspective, Japanese defense documents such as the recent 
NDPO that refers to the North Korean “threat” directly is intended to convince the United 
States to maintain its force presence in the region.  This, in the perspective of Pyongyang, 
as well as some in South Korea, ensures that the Korean peninsula remains weak, divided 
and no threat to Japanese “imperialistic” motivations.  While it is unlikely that Japan can 
convince North Korea otherwise in the foreseeable future, these perceptions can be 
minimized by continuation of an open security dialogue (e.g. the six-party talks) and 
efforts to legitimize any expansion in a regional or global framework.  Japan must also be 
prepared to expand this perception management to issues that North Korea sees as efforts 
to revive Japanese militarism.  
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IV. CHINESE REACTIONS TO EXPANDING THE JSDF 
The future of relations between the People’s Republic of China and Japan 
continues to be one of the major focal points of discussion in East Asia.  Chinese leaders 
have been cautious of a remilitarized Japan since its defeat in World War II.  So 
concerned was Beijing that in 1950 it concluded the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and 
Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union in order to check the “repetition of aggression 
on the part of Japan or any other state which should unite in any form with Japan in acts 
of aggression.”100 Japan–China relations did, however, improve quickly following 
normalization of relations in 1972 as Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
and investment began to pour into China.   
The relationship between China and Japan has grown more complex with the end 
of the Cold War as Japan struggles to identify its place in the “new world order.” 
Although Japan’s kinken gaiko was criticized in the United States and Europe, from a 
Chinese perspective, Japanese response to the Gulf War was considered fair and 
appropriate. With Japan’s efforts toward a more active role in regional and global 
security affairs since the Gulf War, China has become extremely concerned about a 
concerted effort on the part of the United States to rearm Japan as part of an “evil 
alliance” to contain China.101  Japanese leaders are, for their part, concerned about the 
rapidly growing economic and military capabilities of China. The rapid expansion is seen 
by some as the first move by China to assert hegemonic control over Asia.  While Japan 
and China have tried to remain engaged in security matters, internal issues such as the 
Tiananmen protests in 1989 and Japanese treatment of historical issues have often caused 
relations to be temporarily damaged. Even though China remains critical of a perceived 
aggressive foreign policy in Japan, it balances this by actively engaging both Japan and 
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A. JAPAN AND CHINA SECURITY RELATIONS 
Tokyo’s relationship with Beijing after World War II quickly became a victim of 
the U.S. Taiwan policy.  Although the government of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru 
wished to recognize Beijing, the United States placed extreme pressure on Japan to 
recognize Taipei at the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. The Japanese 
public though was more inclined to normalize relations with Beijing, 57 percent 
supported normalizing relations in 1952, and this increased to 75 percent in 1960.102  
Even without formalized relations Japan and China did manage to maintain a small trade 
relationship. 
By the 1970’s growing Soviet power and force build-ups along the Chinese 
border became the greatest concern to Beijing. From 1969 to 1973 Moscow increased its 
Army divisions deployed along the Chinese border from twenty-five to forty-five.  The 
1972 rapprochement with the United States provided an opportunity for China to contain 
the growing Soviet power and establish a new balance of power in Asia.  It also allowed 
the quick recognition of Beijing by Japan and the resumption of trade relations, which 
surpassed trade with Taiwan by 1975 (see Appendix C).  In addition, access to foreign 
investment and technology helped to stimulate a stagnant Chinese economy. Japan also 
benefited from this relationship as Beijing supported Tokyo in the territorial dispute over 
the Kurile Islands and actually supported the strengthening of the U.S.–Japan security 
alliance.  
Japan–China relations improved steadily until the incident at Tiananmen Square 
in 1989.  The international condemnation of China forced Japan to suspend economic ties 
and created an increasingly negative view of China in Japan (See Figure 2 on page 55).  
Japan was, however, the first nation to restore ties with China following the crisis, a 
move that brought criticism on Japan by Western nations.103  Although the trust between 
the two nations had been damaged by the Tiananmen incident, work began quickly to 
restore economic exchanges, including the reestablishment of ODA from Japan to China.  
Japanese ODA continued until China conducted a series of underground nuclear tests at 
the Lop Nor test site in western China in May 1995.  These tests came only days after 
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China had pledged its support to the NPT in New York and less than two weeks after the 
visit of Japanese Prime Minister Murayama, who had called for a halt to worldwide 
nuclear testing.104 Japan’s cancellation of ODA resulted in strong calls by China for 
Japan to resolve its history issues, equating the ODA loans to official reparations, even 
when no official connection existed.  Japanese opinion of China continued to worsen as 
China conducted a large-scale missile exercise opposite Taiwan in 1996 and renewed 
calls to investigate the “China threat” drove a wedge in relations. 
Japan’s greater role in international affairs changed slightly with the publishing of 
the 1997 “Revised Guidelines for Defense Cooperation” that detailed the types of 
assistance that Japan would provide in the event of a regional contingency, including rear 
area support, intelligence sharing, and bilateral planning.105 This was dismissed in China 
as a new step in “Tokyo’s quest for mastery over Asia.”106  Such comments such as there 
were reminiscent of Beijing’s criticisms in the late 1980s when Japanese defense 
spending broke the traditional 1 percent of GNP limit.   At the time it was feared that 
Japanese spending would soon get out of control –– “it is unavoidable,” Beijing stated 
“the second and third ‘breaks’ will follow, and that the state of affairs will get out of 
control.”107  Such second and third breaks did not occur and Japanese defense spending 
soon returned to the 1 percent limit, but suspicions of Japanese motives have remained in 
place. Of particular concern in the revised guidelines was the new concept introduced in 
the agreement that detailed cooperation in “Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan” 
(SIASJ).  Although initially outlined in the 1997 Defense cooperation guidelines, the 
Japanese Diet incorporated it on August 29, 1999 in “the Law Concerning Measures to 
Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan.”108 
The establishment of SIASJ procedures was intended to clarify Japan’s role in regional 
security operations and contingencies, such as through direct support to the United States 
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during a Korean peninsula conflict.109  This allowed Japan to start looking further into 
geographic areas away from the immediate vicinity of Japan that could have an important 
influence on Japan's peace and security.  Specifically China was concerned that this new 
sphere of influence included Taiwan, a move seen in Beijing as an “attempt to extend its 
military feelers into Chinese territory.”110  At the same time Japan and China were also 
moving ahead in efforts to broaden security coordination.  Between 1997 and 1999 
Beijing and Tokyo concluded agreements on maritime accident prevention, joint drills 
and reciprocal port visits.111  These exchanges were, however, overshadowed by 
continued historical distrust. 
The December 2000 MTDP built on many of the pre-existing initiatives from the 
1995 NDPO, but it increased emphasis on protecting Japan from various forms of attacks 
such as guerilla-commando attacks, ballistic missile defense, evacuation of Japanese 
nationals overseas, intelligence, sustainability and survivability.112 Although the MTDP 
was, however, careful to not name any particular countries of concern and kept the source 
of threats thinly veiled, it did not keep Chinese criticism of Japan from reaching a peak 
by mid-2001.  The main focus of which dealt not so much with Japanese military policy, 
but instead with visits by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro to the Yasukuni Jinja, 
revisions of Japanese textbooks and perceived discrimination by Japanese governments 
against Chinese consumers.113    
Following the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, Japan 
became more active in regional and global affairs.  While China supported the U.S. war 
on terrorism, efforts by the Koizumi administration to expand the mission of the JSDF 
have been met with suspicion and criticism.  The growing relationship between Japan and 
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the United Sates as evident in Japan’s active involvement in the global war on terrorism 
raised fears in Beijing of a more active alliance between Washington and Tokyo.  This 
concern has been reinforced by Japanese government publications such as the 2003 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Bluebook, which listed the primary goals of 
Japan as to “firmly maintain the Japan–U.S. security arrangements, moderately build up 
Japan’s defense capability on an appropriate scale and pursue diplomatic efforts to ensure 
international peace and security.”114 In comparison the 1994 Diplomatic Bluebook listed 
the main goals of Japan as to “strengthen the functions of the United Nations and increase 
trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States and Europe.”115
The publishing of the 2004 NDPO has been seen with great concern by Beijing, 
as, according to an English translation by Xinhua news agency, the report states that “it is 
necessary to watch China's nuclear and ballistic missile programs, the modernization of 
its navy and air force and its attempts to expand marine activities.”  The NDPO falls short 
of indicating a direct threat from China as it does from North Korea, but instead 
highlights Japan’s “concerns” about China’s military intent.  Japan Defense Agency 
Director General Ono Yoshinori further emphasized this during the press conference 
unveiling the NDPO and accompanying MTDP in which he highlighted “the recent case 
in which a Chinese submarine intruded into Japanese waters.”116  The Chinese Foreign 
Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue denounced Japan’s inclusion of China in the report 
as “totally groundless and extremely irresponsible.”117  
Although relationships have been strained since early 1989, coordination and 
consultation occurs for a wide range of issues. Japan and China continue to engage in 
regional security mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the six-party 
talks, and the trilateral Foreign Ministers meetings between Japan, China, and South 
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Korea that most recently took place in Vientiane, Laos on November 27, 2004.118  In 
addition, the China–Japan economic relationship has grown extensively in the last ten 
years, with China surpassing the United States as Japan’s leading trade partner in 2004 
(See Appendix C).  Even with these multilateral contacts and strengthened economic 
relations, unless issues of cultural distrust can be worked out, it is unlikely that any 
bilateral security coordination will emerge.  This could, similar to North Korea, lead to a 
continuing downward spiral as Japan expands its JSDF to ensure its own security and 
China counters with a greater emphasis for its own military on offsetting Japan. With 
China’s growing economic power and resource base, neither is an option that the United 
States nor Japan wishes to see. 
B. CHINESE DIPLOMATIC AND SECURITY OPTIONS 
Unlike North Korea, China has a full range of diplomatic options available to use 
in order to try and influence Japanese security policy decision-making.  The strongest 
option for Beijing to express its displeasure with Tokyo has been cancellation of visits by 
senior officials.  While this effectively expresses China’s displeasure over Japanese 
policies and actions, it also has the side effect of reducing cooperation and coordination 
between the nations.  As Japan–China economic relations become increasingly 
interrelated, it will be extremely important for a mutual trust to emerge between the two 
nations.  China also is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC).  Although reluctant to use its veto power, China has expressed its concern over 
Japanese support to U.S. policies in the UN and continues to block efforts by Tokyo to 
obtain a permanent seat on the UNSC.  In addition to formal diplomatic options, China 
has a large military capable of operating outside of territorial waters.  Deployments of 
submarines off Okinawa and research vessels around the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands have shown Beijing’s willingness to use low-level military approaches to 
reinforce its position.  China is, however, careful not to let military options become too 
strong, less it reinforces the regional perception of a “China threat.”  
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In addition, much like North Korea, China’s media are effectively controlled by 
the state, though their content is much less colorful in content.  Beijing uses the press to 
not only inform its public, but also provide subtle (and often not so subtle) indications of 
Chinese opinion on a wide range of security issues. Unlike North Korea, a strong pro-
Taiwan lobby has usurped Chinese unofficial representation in Tokyo, making back-
channel approaches to Japanese lawmakers less influential.    
C. COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN 
Following the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 Japan 
was quick to pledge the assistance of the JMSDF and JASDF in the war on terrorism.   
By November, ships were deployed to the Indian Ocean to assist in logistics for the 
United States, and later coalition forces, conducting operations against the Taliban in 
Afghanistan.   Although China was actively cooperating with the United States on anti-
terrorism measures in order to justify the execution of its own anti-terrorism operations in 
western China, the strong support shown by Tokyo for Washington was a major concern. 
To head off criticism Prime Minister Koizumi met with Chinese leaders to obtain 
“understanding” regarding Japan’s support to the United States.119  Japan also expressed 
its readiness to undertake any expansion of the role of the JSDF.  Although the Chinese 
press often raised Japan’s historical issues as a concern, Beijing did provide an interesting 
concession.  In a meeting between China's Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Japan's 
Deputy Foreign Minister Takano Toshiyuki on November 21, 2001, the Chinese side 
expressed support, stating “if the United Nations plays the leading role and under this 
framework, the countries concerned, including Japan, extend cooperation based on their 
own circumstances, we will welcome it.”120  
Chinese criticisms increased in December 2002, when Japan dispatched the JMS 
Kirishima, an AEGIS class destroyer to the Indian Ocean. This move was seen by China 
as an escalation of the mission that had been agreed upon the previous year. Blame was 
primarily placed on pressure from the United States rather than on Japan itself, with one 
source opining that “Japan's continual escalation of its foreign intervention is the 
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consequence of the continuing escalation of U.S. pressure on Japan.”121  While the initial 
deployment was carefully coordinated and seen as primarily a logistics effort, the 
deployment of one of Japan’s modern AEGIS equipped ships was seen as an aggressive 
move in support of the growing U.S. conflict with Iraq.  Relations between the two 
nations had deteriorated since the initial coordination meetings due to, among other 
things, visits to Yasukuni Jinja by Prime Minister Koizumi and a May 2002 incident at 
the Japanese consulate in Shenyang where Chinese police entered the grounds to remove 
North Korean asylum seekers.  This prevented the same level of coordination that had 
occurred for the first deployment, and increased Chinese suspicions of Japan’s intentions.   
D. IRAQI STABILITY OPERATIONS 
Beijing has become increasingly adamant about greater Japanese military 
involvement in overseas military operations, whether for security or stability purposes.  
Initially one of only a handful of nations that opposed Japan’s deployment of 
peacekeeping troops to Cambodia in 1993, China has become increasingly concerned 
with the ever-expanding role of the JSDF.  Chinese leaders have become even more 
concerned with the deployment of JGSDF soldiers to Iraq in support of the U.S.–led 
coalition outside of a United Nations peacekeeping framework. Such a deployment in 
direct support of the United States has been especially worrisome, as it indicates Japan’s 
willingness to follow the United States on issues not supported in the United Nations and 
questionable under the current constitutional framework.  This has raised concern that 
Japan would more actively support the United States in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait or 
that Japan could also begin to challenge China’s security interests outside of the region.   
It also is seen in Beijing as a sure sign of Tokyo’s desire to return to its former 
position as a global military power.  Japan’s involvement in overseas areas is seen in 
China as part of a large strategy by Japan to remove the pacifist constraints in its post-war 
constitution. In Beijing, legislation passed to allow the deployment was seen as merely 
serving to “drape an ‘overcoat’ of ‘legitimacy’ over Japan’s strategy for turning itself into 
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a major military power.”122  Future deployments in support of active security missions 
will be studied carefully in Beijing.  Any increase in mission scope or size, or more 
importantly, active participation by the JSDF in hostilities, will be met with sharp 
criticism in Beijing.  Active engagement with China in preparation for these missions can 
decrease regional tension, but it is unlikely that China would actively support overseas 
deployments of the JSDF in the near term.   
E. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI) 
Chinese views on the PSI in general are mixed.  China was one of seven APEC 
nations that signed an agreement in Tokyo on October 27, 2003 agreeing to limit the 
export of WMD technologies, yet it has remained reluctant to endorse the PSI.123 While 
supporting overall initiatives to stem the proliferation of WMD, there are concerns in 
Beijing over the legality of certain aspects of the law.  Specific among these concerns is 
that the seizure of ships on the high seas would violate the right of free passage afforded 
by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.  China has stated that while it 
supports the overall non-proliferation initiative, the problem of “proliferation shall be 
resolved through political and diplomatic means within the framework of international 
laws.”124  Beijing prefers to address the root causes of proliferation, such as unstable 
security environments, rather risking active seizure of materiel that could lead to a 
regional conflict. 
While support from China has been limited, Japan has played a critical role in 
garnering regional support, first by hosting the APEC proliferation meeting in October 
2003, followed by the Asian Senior level Talks on Proliferation (ASTOP) in November, 
and by addressing the issue at the ASEAN–Japan regional summit in Tokyo in December 
that year.  Japan has also actively pursued Chinese participation in the PSI.  Beijing’s 
reluctance to participate has less to do with Japan’s active involvement in regional 
security frameworks than with concerns of upsetting North Korea and the six-party 
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talks.125  China fears that participation in the PSI would inhibit its capability to apply the 
little remaining political pressure that Beijing has over Pyongyang.  As long as the 
current crisis over North Korea’s nuclear program continues, it is unlikely that China will 
actively support this initiative.  China will also not criticize Japan’s involvement as long 
as Japan stays clear of controversial situations, such as participation in a high seas 
boarding. 
F. TSUNAMI RELIEF 
Much like Japan, China was quick to offer support to countries hit by the 
December 2004 earthquake and tsunami. Following the disaster, China was quick to try 
and appear as a “big country” and show the “friendliness of the Chinese government and 
people.”126  China approved a $2.6 million aid package on December 28, only two days 
after the event.  Although the initial amount was low compared to what other 
industrialized nations pledged, China claimed it was appropriate due China’s position as 
a “developing” country with a low per capita GDP.  This argument was, interestingly 
enough, maintained when the amount was raised to $60.2 million on December 31, 2004 
with an additional $20 million added on January 6, 2005.127   
Historically, China is cautious when dealing with Southeast Asia due to its own 
failed attempts to support communist revolutions in the 1960s, but increasing dependence 
on foreign raw materials and integration into the regional economy have caused China to 
look more to the South.  China is also concerned by what it perceives as efforts by the 
United States and Japan to co-opt ASEAN support in regional issues, such as territorial 
disputes and trade differences.  China moved quickly to provide aid in order to head off 
criticism that only the United States and Japan were in positions to provide military 
support to disaster relief operations by the public announcement of the use of the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in providing support to disaster relief.128  That support, 
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however, was limited to logistics within China in order to consolidate supplies at airports 
for delivery in the region by civilian aircraft.  Deployments to the region were limited to 
an engineering unit from Beijing to assist in recovery operations and a People’s Armed 
Police mobile hospital deployed to Indonesia.129
The PLA has not traditionally played a large role in either peacekeeping or 
humanitarian operations, as seen by the slow response to use the PLA during the 1998 
floods.130   Instead China has supported United Nations leadership in these areas. 
Although Beijing was likely concerned that a PLA military presence in Southeast Asia 
would increase the perception of a “China threat,” the deployment of the JMSDF and 
JGSDF in a coordinated operation under a JTF structure will undoubtedly be studied in 
Beijing. While official response to the Japanese deployment has been minimal, the 
possibility exists that the decision not to act could be interpreted in Tokyo as a Chinese 
inability to act. 131  
While Japan has carefully managed the deployment so as not to inflame criticism 
in the region, the apparent ready acceptance of Japanese troops and efforts at regional 
leadership, compared with the lukewarm response to China’s presence, could increase 
China’s perception of an attempt at regional isolation.  China will not likely protest future 
humanitarian operations in the region by the JSDF, but the reaction could become critical 
if China sees Japan as trying to marginalize Chinese relations in the region.   
G. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
Chinese concerns over the Japanese ballistic missile defense programs began in 
1995 when discussions of a joint U.S.–Japan TMD systems were initiated.  Beijing 
consistently argued that the development of any such system could “undermine China’s 
nuclear deterrent and might be extended to the defense of Taiwan.”132 Chinese leverage 
on this situation was, however, nullified by North Korea’s launch of a Taepo Dong 
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missile in August 1998.  By October 1998, Tokyo and Washington announced their intent 
to jointly develop a system, only a month before Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited 
Tokyo.  The visit occurred as planned, with no mention of the Japanese decision to 
participate in the NTWD system.   
The December 2004 NPDO placed renewed emphasis on the joint research, 
development and deployment of a missile defense with the United States.133  With this 
renewed emphasis has come renewed criticism from China, which points to the 
development as further proof of Japan’s “long-term strategic objective to become a big 
political and military power…”134 Currently, the system that Japan plans to develop is 
designed strictly to protect Japan from attack by a small number of short– to medium– 
range ballistic missiles, not as part of the broader U.S. NMD system. While the system 
will include only low altitude interceptors, similar to those already deployed on the 
AEGIS destroyers, Beijing is concerned that once in place the Japanese system could be 
expanded to include higher altitude interception capabilities intended to stop Chinese 
inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM) aimed at the United States.  As a result, 
Chinese response is curiously mixed.  While Beijing understands the rationale for Tokyo 
to develop a system to protect itself from North Korean missile attacks, it is very 
concerned that recent anti-China rhetoric in Japan could indicate intent to deploy the 
system against China.  Future response from Beijing to the development and deployment 
of the system will likely be cautious, but the issue is unlikely to upset long-term relations 
as long as the system will not be used against China.  Deployment of a ground based 
missile defense system to Southern Kyushu or more importantly Okinawa or deployment 
of JMSDF AEGIS destroyers on missile defense missions outside of the Sea of Japan will 
likely be met with an immediate negative response from Beijing.  Such moves, even if 
seen as defensive in Tokyo will most certainly be seen as escalatory by Beijing. 
H. RESOLUTION OF HISTORICAL ISSUES 
The legacy of Japanese forces in China during the Pacific War has often been a 
point of major contention between Beijing and Tokyo.  Chinese claims of Japanese 
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intransigence over issues such as the issuance of a formal apology and the continued 
visits to Yasukuni Jinja by the Prime Minister have hindered relations.  The Japanese 
occupation was also bought to the forefront in Chinese views in 2003 when a Japanese 
artillery shell left over from World War II, filled with mustard gas, exploded, resulting in 
one death and forty-three injured.135  Although Japan paid almost $2.8 million in 
damages, the wound was much deeper to Chinese public opinion.  Japan, on the other 
hand, sees China as unwilling to truly accept any apology and that China continues to 
exploit the past for immediate gains.  In truth, both views are likely correct.   
Official Chinese response to the approval of the 2001 New History Textbook was 
extremely negative. Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Banzao warned Japan that China 
“would not accept the interpretation of wartime events put forth by the new textbook.”136 
Specifically, Beijing was concerned that the book excluded any mention of  “germ 
warfare experiments carried out on Chinese citizens by the notorious Unit 731 of the 
Japanese army” and even cast “doubt on the extent and veracity of the Rape of 
Nanking…”137  Simultaneously, there were internal and external pressures being placed 
on Prime Minister Koizumi regarding his planned visit to Yasukui Jinja in August 2001. 
The visit was strongly denounced in China and has emerged as “the primary impediment 
to improving bilateral relations.”138  
Although public relations were strained at the highest levels, working level 
meetings continued, only to be further damaged by continued visits to Yasukuni Jinja.  In 
early 2002, preparations were being made for the visit of the Director General of the 
Japan Defense Agency, Nakatani Gen to China.  This visit was intended in preparation of 
the first reciprocal visits by JMSDF ships to China and the People’s Liberation Army 
Navy (PLAN) ships to Japan. These visits were quickly cancelled in April 2002 when 
Prime Minister Koizumi and nearly 190 Japanese lawmakers or their proxies visited 
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Yasukuni Jinja.139 Although a visit by Director General Ishiba Shigeru with his Chinese 
counterpart Cao Gangchuan in Shanghai did occur in September 2003, plans to conduct 
reciprocal port visits in November 2003 were postponed due to concerns over upsetting 
the ongoing six-party talks.140 The Yasukuni Jinja issue has become such a concern for 
China that it is unwilling to accept any negotiations on the subject; Japan must stop 
official visits to the shrine for relations to improve.  China views the visits to the shrine as 
such an affront to its history that it is willing to sacrifice improved relations with Japan 
until Tokyo relents. 
The view in Japan is quite different.  Tokyo, for its part, has expressed a 
willingness to apologize to China for historical issues, but only if such issues can be put 
behind them once and for all.  In the view of Japanese, Japan has repeatedly accepted 
responsibility for the occupation of foreign nations.  These steps include the speech made 
by Emperor Akihito during his visit to China in 1992, when he recalled “there was a 
period in the past when my country inflicted untold hardship on the people of China.  
This remains the source of my profound personal sorrow.”141 A similar expression of 
regret was repeated on May 3, 1995 with the visit of Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi 
to the Marco Polo Bridge, where he “prayed for Japan–China friendship and eternal 
peace.”142 Although these speeches were well received in China, relations between Japan 
and China were severely damaged two weeks later, on May 15, when China conducted a 
nuclear test a Lop Nor.  In protest of the tests Japan froze economic aid and China once 
again began to play the “history card.”   
Japan–China relations had a chance to improve with the visit of Chinese President Jiang 
Zemin to Tokyo in November 1998.  In preparation for the visit, Japan announced that 
they were willing to offer a full apology, including the use of the terms hansei (deep 
remorse) and owabi (heartfelt apology), if China were willing to accept this as the “final 
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word” on the issue.  This offer was flatly rejected by Beijing.  The situation became even 
more uncomfortable for Tokyo during an official state dinner for President Jiang at the 
Imperial Palace hosted by Emperor Akihito.  During the formal toast, President Jiang, 
dressed in a Mao jacket, criticized Japan’s unwillingness to address the history problem 
during the formal toast.143  Both the Japanese press and politicians were extremely 










































Figure 2.   Japanese Public Opinion of China144 
 
Continued calls by China for Japan to resolve its “history issues” are creating a 
strong backlash in Japan, and more attention is being focused on the way China is 
teaching its own modern history (See Figure 2).  For example, Japanese scholars are 
quick to point out that Chinese students are unaware of the positive role that Japanese 
economic assistance has played in helping China to build its economy, nor are they 
taught about the consequences of China’s own disastrous policies during the Great Leap                                                  
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Forward. This has led to an increasingly negative view of Japanese by Chinese youths.  
In a survey of 100,000 youths taken in 1996 by the China Youth News only “14 percent 
thought Japan-China relations were good, while 42 percent did not have a “favorable” 
impression of Japan.”145  Japanese public opinion of China has been equally bad since 
the 1989 Tiananmen incident. 
The constant “Japan bashing” in China has continued to be an obstacle to a 
resolution of the history issue, and as long as it continues, domestic support will be 
against issuing any additional apologies.  Japanese concern was raised even higher by the 
near riots during the summer 2004 Asia Cup soccer games, when Japanese fans were kept 
in the stadium long after a match against China ended for their own safety while anti–
Japanese protestors were dispersed, this was likely a contributing factor in the large drop 
in public opinion in 2004.146  This anti–Japanese attitude among the Chinese population 
has grown beyond the government’s ability to control it and has created concern in both 
Beijing and Tokyo over the safety of Japanese athletes and spectators during the 
upcoming 2008 Olympics. 
I. SUMMARY 
Chinese response to the six case studies reveals an interesting pattern, as seen in 
Table 2.  China is primarily opposed to moves seen by Japan as nationalistic, although 
the right to individual self-defense is not as strongly questioned.  China is also opposed to 
the expansion of Japan’s military mission in a global environment.  This is primarily due 
to the concern that global ambitions will lead to a resurgence of militarism in Japan. 
Considering Beijing’s concerns over national and global ambitions by China, it is 
interesting to note that China appears to accept Japan’s involvement in regional security 
affairs.  This is most likely due to Japan’s open participation in regional security 
organizations and an understanding in Beijing that as long as Japan remains a regional 
power it will follow the lead of the United States.  Japan’s moves into a global arena 
could indicate the creation of a truly independent security policy in Tokyo. 
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For the foreseeable future, the greatest impediment to improved security relations 
between Beijing and Tokyo will be the resolution of historical issues.  Solving these 
problems is not something that Japan can do alone. In order for Japan and China to move 
beyond this diplomatic impasse created by historical issues, both sides must put forth 
good faith initiatives to resolve this issue.  Japan must have greater understanding of how 
deep the historical issues run in China.  Beijing, for its part, must be ready to abandon its 
use of historical issues as a foreign policy tool and work with Japan to truly resolve the 
issues. 
 
 Global Regional National 
Case Study Afghanistan PSI Missile Defense Security 
Oriented 
Activities Reaction Concerned of Precedence Reserved 
Concerned of 
Expansion 
Case Study Iraq Tsunami Relief Historical Issues Stability 
Oriented 
Activities Reaction Opposed Competition/ Concern 
Increasingly 
Hostile 
Table 2. Chinese Perceptions of Japanese Stability and Security Activities 
 
Security dialogues, such as the February 2004 six party talks and the 2003 Iraqi 
reconstruction meetings in Tokyo, have emphasized Japanese participation in regional 
and global security affairs.  These efforts have brought praise by many nations, but also 
raised questions from many within the Chinese government and military about what the 
desired role Japan has for itself in world affairs.  Fears of a reemergence of militarism 
similar to that which affected all of Asia in the first half of the 20th century will keep 
Chinese planners nervously eyeing Japanese improvements in the near term and continue 
to lead to harsh rhetoric portraying the Japanese as “bellicose, murderous and 
suicidal.”147   
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V. SOUTH KOREAN REACTIONS TO EXPANDING THE JSDF 
While Japan–North Korea relations have traditionally concentrated on the desire 
to obtain security guarantees and Japan’s relations with China have often revolved around 
maintaining a balance of power, relations between Japan and South Korea have been 
much more complex.  Japan and South Korea are both allies of the United States and 
therefore de facto allies of each other.  At the same time, both are also increasingly 
regional economic and political competitors and suffer from a strong historical distrust. 
This has created a situation where Japan and South Korea’s security relationship is 
increasingly influenced by political actions in both Tokyo and Seoul. While the security 
relationship between the nations continues to be based on the threat from North Korea, 
the perception that each has of the situation is increasingly divergent.  Japan sees North 
Korean brinkmanship as destabilizing to the region, yet the current South Korean 
administration sees little direct threat as long as North Korea remains unprovoked.   
There are also differences in views of what is needed for broader regional 
security.  Seoul’s views of expanding the JSDF mission have varied significantly since 
Tokyo initiated major changes in 1991.  These responses, however, have been based 
more on how Seoul views Japan in the regional context than Japan’s actions directly.  
Specifically, there are three security relationships that influence Seoul’s opinion of Japan 
and the JSDF. First is how South Korea perceives U.S. global and regional policies.  
When the U.S. policy is seen as inconsistent with the best interest of South Korea, 
reaction to Japanese security activities that support the United States worsens.  On the 
other hand, when Japan supports U.S. security policies that are in South Korea’s interests 
reaction–while not necessarily positive–is at least non-committal.  The second key aspect 
of regional security for South Korea is its perception of China.  While many South 
Korean leaders are increasingly pro-China, the lack of transparency in China’s military 
modernization could provide greater support for Japan’s defense build-up, which, while 
worrisome in historical perspective, is perceived as more transparent.  The third factor is 
how South Korea views the threat from North Korea.  When South Korea is concerned 
that  the  chance of   a  military  confrontation  with  the  North  has  grown,  an  increased  
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Japanese role in regional security mechanisms is encouraged.  If, however, the view is 
that North Korea is not likely to threaten South Korea, the Japanese defense build-up can 
be seen as destabilizing to the region.148  
South Korea, like China, is concerned that the JSDF deployments overseas are a 
sign of current efforts in the Japanese government to develop an independent security 
policy. Japan, in the eyes of many South Koreans, is attempting to “become a nation 
capable of acting on what it considers necessary for its own national benefits, meaning it 
ultimately desires independence or sovereignty in political and military matters.”149 
Unlike China, South Korea has no interest in seeing the U.S.–Japan security relationship 
deteriorate.  A fundamental shift in the U.S. security guarantees, coupled with Japan’s 
efforts at normalcy, would undoubtedly lead to the collapse of the post-war security 
system and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region.  This would open up the 
possibility of a conflict with China and/or North Korea, with South Korea in the middle.   
In order to avoid such a scenario, South Korea continues actively to engage Japan in 
security manners whenever practical. 
A. JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS 
Japan and South Korea normalized relations in 1965.  While initially the 
relationship was focused primarily on economic issues, South Korea being a major 
recipient of Japan’s ODA, Japan’s more active security policy in the 1990s along with the 
end of the Cold War brought about new opportunities for coordination on security issues. 
Intelligence exchanges and senior military–to–military visits between Japan and South 
Korea have occurred steadily since the mid–1990s, to the point where they are now 
considered commonplace. Japan and South Korea also conducted their first joint naval 
search and rescue exercise on August 4-5, 1999 between Cheju Do and Kyushu.150  The 
exercise involving three ships from Japan and two from South Korea began with a two-
day visit to Pusan and ended with a visit by the ships to Sasebo.  The exercise received 
little coverage, either for or against, in South Korea.  This lack of coverage is actually 
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seen as indication of the improving relations between the countries. Japanese press, on 
the other hand, widely reported the exercise as “the start of a new era” in Japan-South 
Korean relations.151
Even with improving bilateral relations, the security of Japan and South Korea 
both remains intertwined with the United States, for not only does a U.S. presence in 
Korea have the effect of deterring North Korean aggression, but the presence of U.S. 
troops in Korea also is seen in Japan as keeping “South Korea within the U.S.–Japan 
orbit–as a partner, not a satellite–and insuring that when unification takes place, the entire 
peninsula remains aligned with Japan and the United States.”152  South Korea is also 
interested in maintaining the U.S. presence in Japan, partly in order to ensure Japan’s 
logistical support in the event of a conflict with North Korea, but also to ensure that the 
United States will keep Japan from exerting its own influence too strongly in the region.   
Even though South Korea is interested in a stable U.S.–Japanese strategic 
partnership, there has often been concern that the relationship would result in the 
abandonment of Seoul, or at least of its interests.  This suspicion grew in 1997 with the 
signing of the revised guidelines for defense cooperation between the United States and 
Japan.  South Korea reacted carefully to the new guidelines, eventually announcing its 
“support with caution.”153  The concern most expressed in Seoul was that the loose 
definition of SIASJ could “interfere with the interests of a third country” (namely South 
Korea) and could be “interpreted as a tactic for containing China” resulting in a regional 
conflict.154  Although a bilateral agreement, there was extensive coordination with South 
Korea to include trilateral meetings in March and May 1997, and April 1998 to assuage 
fears of abandonment.  This agreement also likely gave impetus for South Korea and 
Japan to update their own bilateral security policy, which had been in place since the 
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initial normalization talks in 1965.  The “Japan-ROK Joint Declaration on a New 
Partnership toward the Twenty-first Century” was signed in Tokyo on October 8, 1998. 
The joint declaration and accompanying 43-point implementation plan covered a wide 
range of issues to include fisheries agreements and an understanding to try to resolve the 
Takeshima/Tokdo island dispute.155  Most importantly it helped to establish bilateral 
security cooperation and expand military exchanges.  
The recent announcements to permanently move the U.S. headquarters away from 
the DMZ, reassign 3,600 U.S. troops from South Korea to Iraq in August 2004 and the 
long term reduction of U.S. Army presence from 37,000 to 24,000 by September 2008 
have been cause for concern in both Korea and Japan.156  Reaction to the reduction in 
both Tokyo and Seoul has been reminiscent of the attempt during the Carter 
administration by the United States to reduce Korean force levels.  At the time, the Carter 
proposal to consolidate forces back in the United States and remove the U.S. presence on 
the Korean peninsula was heavily protested by Japan and South Korea.  South Korean 
influence in Washington was limited, but a coordinated effort by Japanese and Korean 
lobbies contributed to getting the proposal shelved.  An unintended consequence of the 
Carter proposal was the forging of closer relations between Tokyo and Seoul.  Reaction 
to the current round of relocations has been lessened by active engagement by the Bush 
administration to negotiate changes to the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) structure.  In 2003 
alone there were numerous meetings to discuss the realignment of forces between U.S. 
and Korean senior defense and political officials.157  These talks, while separate from 
those occurring between Tokyo and Washington, are often the subject of conversation 
between Japanese and Korean defense officials. 
Concern in both nations is that a withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region could 
embolden China to exert its power. These fears were further fueled in Japan following the 
election of South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun and the rise of the Uri party.  Prior to 
the 2004 National Assembly elections in South Korea, 187 of 273 standing assemblymen 
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participated in the Japan-South Korea Parliamentarian Friendship League, yet after the 
rise of the Uri party there remain only 62 members with ties to the League. In addition, in 
a recent poll of Uri party members about foreign policy priorities, a much higher 
emphasis was placed with China (63 percent) then with Japan (2 percent).158  
While the election of the Uri party in South Korea has brought Seoul and Beijing 
closer, there is still concern in Seoul that the rapid military build-up in China is a sign of 
Beijing’s desire to further wield its power.  Seoul now finds itself in the middle of what it 
perceives as two rising powers in Asia.  This has led to a policy that seeks to minimize 
confrontation between China and Japan. Unfortunately, Japan’s recent statements that 
identify China as a security concern are unsettling to Seoul.  Although worried over the 
potential for a future conflict, most analysts rule out the possibility of such an occurrence 
until after the 2008 Olympics and 2010 World Exposition, both to be hosted by China.  
For South Korea, the possibility of the United States and Japan provoking action from 
North Korea is a more immediate concern. 
Most recently, the 2004 NDPO and the 2005 United States–Japan joint statement 
have gone farther in identifying the threat posed directly from the North Korean nuclear 
program.   Seoul was careful not to upset the current United States–Japan partnership by 
opposing the NDPO.  Instead, it limited its response to an unnamed official in the Foreign 
Affairs and Trade Ministry who called for more transparency with respect to defense 
policy guidelines in light of concerns about Japan's militaristic past.159 The greatest 
concern to Seoul was the declaration of North Korea as “a significantly unstable factor in 
regional security and a serious problem for global nonproliferation efforts.”160 The 
February 2005 joint statement, on the other hand, was virtually ignored in South Korean 
press and diplomatic reporting.  Instead, greater emphasis was placed on the trilateral 
coordination to bring North Korea back to the six-party talks that occurred the following 
week. Even though Seoul often disagrees with joint U.S.–Japan policy regarding North 
Korea, Japan is cautious to coordinate with Seoul on most security issues involving North 
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Korea.161  For example, Japan-North Korea normalization talks, which started in 1991, 
were heavily coordinated with South Korea in order to ensure that they proceeded at “a 
pace acceptable to Seoul.”162 Although some coordination regarding the North Korean 
nuclear issues occurs bilaterally, most is conducted through the Trilateral Coordination 
and Oversight Group (TCOG) between the United States, Japan, and South Korea, which 
was initiated in March 1999. During the January 2004 TCOG meeting, a consensus was 
reached that obtained Seoul’s commitment to the “complete, verifiable, and irreversible 
dismantlement” on North Korea’s nuclear program.163  
Although there are often agreements on security policy direction, the means by 
which policy is implemented is still cause for disagreement between Tokyo and Seoul, as 
was seen during the recent Trilateral Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Japan, China, 
and South Korea that took place in Vientiane on November 27, 2004.  While dealing 
mostly with legal consultation, security issues such as the current North Korean nuclear 
crisis and United Nations reform were also discussed. When the Japanese Foreign 
Minister broached the subject of North Korea, South Korean Foreign Minister Ban 
“stated that it was very frustrating that nuclear development in North Korea has 
continued to be an issue of concern,” indication that South Korea’s sense of urgency 
regarding the crisis differs greatly from that in Japan.164  Defense meetings have often 
yielded the same result. A recent example of this is the November 2003 meeting between 
Director General of JDA Ishiba Shigeru and his counterpart the South Korean Defense 
Minister Cho Young-kil.  In the meeting Cho stressed the importance of patience in 
dealing with the North, while Ishiba highlighted the need for “pressure” to complement 
diplomacy in order to modify North Korea’s behavior.165 This inability to see eye-to-eye 
has often led to tension that can be exacerbated by other issues that remain unresolved 
between Seoul and Tokyo. 
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In addition to disagreements over security issues on the Korean peninsula, South 
Korea has also remained cautious of Japan’s effort to increase its global standing.  Many 
in Seoul see that the establishment of a independent foreign policy in Japan as portending 
a future break in the U.S.–Japan security relationship.  Seoul’s response to Japan’s push 
for a permanent position on the United Nations Security Council is evidence of this.  In 
late 2001, South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon revealed South Korea’s support 
for expanding the non-permanent member seats in the UNSC, but not the permanent 
seats, an effective way to express its unease over Japan’s bid for a permanent seat without 
directly criticizing Japan.166
Even with differences in policy implementation, coordination and contact 
continues between the two governments. High-level talks continue even when relations 
deteriorate.  The relationship between Prime Minister Koizumi and President Roh, while 
not friendly, is still solid. The meeting between the two leaders held on December 17, to 
discuss options for restarting the six-party talks was the 8th since President Roh took 
office in February 2003.167  Many exchanges also occur below the radar of typical press 
coverage.  According to an itinerary posted on the JMSDF website, the South Korean 
Chief of Naval Operations visited Tokyo for four days in January 2005, but yet the visit 
received no observable press coverage in either country.168  Opportunities exist for the 
Japan–South Korea security relationship to improve as both become more involved in 
regional and international security forums and operations.  Critical to this will be not only 
maintaining, but also expanding military confidence building measures to ensure that 
South Korea does not become overly suspicious of Japanese efforts to expand the JSDF.  
B. SOUTH KOREAN DIPLOMATIC AND SECURITY OPTIONS 
Japan and South Korea coordinate a wide range of issues through formal and 
informal diplomatic channels at all levels of government.  The most important means for 
coordinating policy is the open communication between the leaders of South Korea and 
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(accessed December 14, 2004). 
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ni Koushiki Shotai ni Tsuite (Invitation to the South Korean Chief of Naval Operations).” January 25, 2005. 
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Japan.  While relations between the two countries are not always the best, the dialogue 
between senior civilian and uniformed personnel has remained open.  In addition to the 
bilateral relationship, the shared security relationship with the United States provides 
another means to coordinate and discuss security policy.  Unlike China and North Korea, 
the South Korean press is not censored.  While the government can issue press reports 
like those in any other free democracy, the slant on the statements varies according to the 
ideological leanings of the various new outlets, often making it easy to confuse opinion 
with policy.  Japan and South Korea have also opened up to each other’s culture.  In the 
late 1990s, South Korea recently lifted a ban on Japanese cultural material, allowing for 
Japanese television programs and movies to be shown in South Korea.  South Korea is 
also exporting its own cultural achievements to Japan.  This greater exchange of culture 
has helped to increase trust and understanding among the populace and decrease fears of 
the others intentions.169  
C. COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN 
Japan and South Korea, as key allies of the United States in Asia, were in unique 
positions to support the global war on terrorism.  The attacks on New York and 
Washington brought home the possibility of terrorist attacks occurring anywhere.  While 
both Japan and South Korea have a fairly small Muslim population, both were concerned 
of the possibility of Al Qaida conducting an attack.  The revelation that Al Qaida 
members travel to Japan and the inclusion of South Korea and Japan on the list of Al 
Qaida target countries helped to solidify this support.  South Korean response to the Anti-
Terrorism Special Measures law and the deployment of the JMSDF to the Indian Ocean 
was notably absent.  This was likely due to a combination of South Korean support for 
the United States and extensive efforts by Prime Minister Koizumi to ensure the 
transparency of the deployment.  In the view of Seoul, the JMSDF deployment to the 
Indian Ocean has also helped to solidify the U.S.–Japan security partnership, ensuring 
that Japan  remains  firmly in the U.S. sphere of influence.  The deployment overseas into  
 
169 In my discussion with many younger Koreans, it is their common consensus that the liberalization 
of the press and the import of Japanese cultural material have helped many younger Koreans to see the 
positive role that Japan played in supporting Korea’s current economic progress in the later part of the 20th 
century.   
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“uncharted waters” is however viewed with a mix of concern and admiration.  The 
JMSDF was able to conduct sustained blue water operations in support of up to 40 
coalition vessels, a feat that the South Korean Navy could not have accomplished. 
While future expansion by the JMSDF in support of global security operations 
will likely raise concern that Japan is once again pushing to become a global economic 
and military power, if conducted in support of a wide-ranging coalition South Korean 
official reaction will remain guarded.  If Japan, on the other hand, is seen as pursuing its 
own self-interest, then it will likely be met with greater suspicion and likely protest from 
Seoul. 
D. IRAQI STABILITY OPERATIONS 
Both Tokyo and Seoul expressed support for rebuilding efforts in Iraq.  Japan 
provided the second largest contribution of financial aid and South Korea the third largest 
in manpower when in February 2004, the South Korean national assembly approved the 
dispatch of 3,000 troops to Northern Iraq by a vote of 155-50-7.170  Although the South 
Korean government passed the legislation easily, the deployment to Iraq was still 
domestically unpopular.  The fact that the deployment of the JSDF was unpopular in 
Japan created a perception that the United States was pressuring both Japan and South 
Korea to join the coalition in order to add legitimacy.  This kindred sense of 
victimization, a sort of combined higaisha ishiki, helped to soften South Korean public 
reaction to the Japanese deployment.  Nonetheless, the Seoul remains nervous about 
Japan’s eagerness to expand its mission overseas.  There are also increasing fears that the 
United States has started playing a more active role in encouraging Japan’s militarization 
rather than “keeping the cork on the bottle.”  Future deployments in stability operations 
will likely be judged on a case-by-case basis in Seoul, those that Seoul actively 
participates in will be met with little criticism.  Once again, however, if Japan is seen as 
pursuing its own self-interest or if the United States is seen as pressuring the JSDF to 
expand beyond a defensive role, the response will be much more negative. 
E. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI) 
The PSI is an extremely sensitive subject in Seoul, considering the direct impact it 
could have on South Korea.  As such, South Korea has been careful to distance itself 
 
170 Cha. “Happy Birthday Mr. Kim.” 
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from the Initiative.  Although U.S. military officials have suggested South Korean 
involvement in non-proliferation measures, Seoul has not joined the PSI, nor has it been 
invited to the 2003 and 2004 regional exercises.171  The diplomatic impact that South 
Korean involvement would have on both bilateral normalization talks and on the six-
party talks would be far reaching.  North Korea would view the South’s participation in 
the initiative as a hostile act and would likely use it as a further excuse to delay talks.  
The situation would be even more complex if South Korea were even indirectly involved 
in the seizure of North Korean WMD material as part of a PSI framework.  North Korea 
has repeatedly expressed its position that any seizure of North Korean cargo would be 
interpreted as an act of war.  While the ability of North Korea to impact the United States 
is limited, South Korea could quickly become the target of North Korean hostility. 
Due to South Korea’s position regarding the PSI, it is difficult to judge the 
perception of Japanese participation in the initiative.  While not opposing Japan’s 
involvement, it is likely that South Korea will continue to remain cautious of any 
movement by Japan that is seen as isolating the North Korean regime. Although not 
directly related to the PSI, the issue of unilateral economic sanction suggested by Tokyo 
against North Korea is a good indicator of Seoul’s concerns. Uri party chairman Lee Bu-
young stated that economic sanctions could initiate “something unwanted by both Japan 
and South Korea.”172  These unintended consequences are exactly the reason South 
Korea has not joined the PSI and remains cautious of implementation in Northeast Asia. 
F. TSUNAMI RELIEF 
Like Japan, Korea has also responded to the tsunami relief efforts with naval and 
air deployments of its own. Two Korean tank landing ships (the same class as the 
Japanese ship) and one air force transport made deliveries to Sri Lanka and Indonesia in 
early 2005.173  South Korea has been careful to match Japanese contributions, if not in 
quantity, at least in scope.  Situations such as peacekeeping and humanitarian relief 
operations are areas that Japan and South Korea not only can cooperate in, but also 
 
171 Cossa et al. “Countering the Spread of WMD: The Role of the PSI.” 
172 Kang. “Improving and Maturing, but Slowly.” 
173 Embassy of Korea in the United States. “Navy Ship Delivers Relief Goods to Sri Lanka.” February 
15, 2005. http://www.koreaembassyusa.org/newspress/dsp_newspress.cfm?relid=2330&type=1 (accessed 
February 18, 2005). 
67 
                                                
compete in.  Neither Seoul nor Tokyo wants to be perceived as unresponsive to regional 
crises and concerns.  As a result, both countries are careful to gauge the other’s 
involvement and will remain open to all aspects of support.  At the same time it is likely 
that Korean defense officials are carefully monitoring the deployment of Japan’s largest 
ship in support of a joint JMSDF and JGSDF operation.  In Seoul’s view, these 
incremental advances in capabilities could pave the way for more direct JSDF 
involvement in regional security affairs. 
G. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
Seoul’s view of ballistic missile defense is different from that of its neighbors. 
North Korea and China see the system as an attempt to undermine their deterrence 
capabilities.  Without a ballistic missile force, Tokyo perceives the system as one of the 
few options to protect it from North Korean or Chinese attacks.  South Korea, although 
initially having planned to deploy Patriot PAC-3 missiles as a missile defense, perceives 
the system as little help in protecting Seoul from the literally thousands of artillery pieces 
in range of the capital.  Therefore, Japan’s moves to develop the system, along with 
statements made that Japan would not participate in collective defense with the system, 
has reinforced the perception that Japan is seeking only to defend itself from foreign 
aggression.  Similar steps to improve Japan’s defense capability will likely be met with 
little response by Seoul. 
H. RESOLUTION OF HISTORICAL ISSUES 
The deadlock over understanding a consistent concept of security in Northeast 
Asia between Tokyo and Seoul can most likely be traced back to an event not related to 
security.  The government of Japan’s approval of a controversial history textbook 
severely damaged and resulted in anti–Japanese protests over “textbooks that allegedly 
gloss over atrocities by Japanese soldiers during World War II.”174  As a result of 
differences in “historical perception” scheduled visits by the JMS Kashima and JMS 
Yamagiri to Inchon were cancelled during the summer 2001 training cruise.175  South 
Korean President Kim Dae-jung announced his “shock” over the Japanese governments 
refusal to revise the textbooks.  He went on state his concern that “all the efforts I have 
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made so far to build a truly friendly relationship with Japan may have to go back to 
square one.”176  The aftermath of this event was a rising anti–Japanese nationalism in 
South Korea, which is exacerbated by visits of Prime Minister Koizumi to the Yasukuni 
Jinja.  This anti–Japanese feeling was also felt at the 2002 Soccer World Cup, when the 
South Korean fans cheered wildly at Japan’s loss in the semi-finals, a scene that received 
much coverage in Japanese press.177  In addition, historical issues revolving around 
Japanese high school textbooks, anti-Korean comments by Japanese politicians and 
claims of Japanese intransigence over the visits to Yasukuni Jinja by Japanese Prime 
Ministers continue to impede relations.178  President Roh, regarded as essentially 
pragmatic in his policies, was careful not to press the history issue early in his 
administration, stating that it was not “desirable for the South Korean government to 
force it.”179
Unlike China and North Korea, South Korea is attempting to work constructively 
with Japan to resolve historical issues.  During the December 2004 South Korea–Japan 
foreign ministers summit, South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon reiterated 
President Roh’s hope that Japan would deal with the history issue on its own initiative 
and that the joint history study would be continued.180  South Korea and Japan continue 
to try to reach a common understanding of history issues.  President Roh visited the 
Emperor during his visit to Japan on June 6, 2003, Korea’s memorial day for soldiers 
who have died in the service of their country.181  The Emperor also has attempted to ease 
tensions by highlighting the kinship between Japan and Korea, most significantly was the 
announcement in December 2001 that the imperial line had blood relations with the 
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Korean peninsula.182 Although the planned visit by the Emperor to Korea for the 2002 
World Cup soccer matches did not occur, the possibility remains that such a visit could 
occur in the near term.  It is likely that, if timed correctly, the visit could help to relieve 
many of the suspicions that Koreans have of the Emperor, a figure that brought fear to 








































Figure 3.   Japanese Public Opinion of South Korea184 
 
On the whole, Japanese and South Korean opinion has been improving steadily 
since the mid 1990s. (Figure 3)  Greater exchange of cultural and increased cooperation 
between the governments has helped to improve this view.  In addition in recent years 
Japan has been the rise of hanryu (Korean wave).  This has been amplified due to the 
recent popularity of the South Korea soap opera, Winter Sonata, which has recently been 
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airing on the official Japanese television station, NHK.185  It is still too early to see how 
relations in 2005 will turn out.  Continued disputes over a new draft of the history 
textbook as well as the reemergence of the Takeshima/Tokdo dispute could indicate a 
worsening of relations.  On the other hand, 2005 is the 40th anniversary of the 
normalization of relations between Seoul and Tokyo.  Japan is also hosting the World 
Expo in Aichi in 2005, and has extended visa waivers to Beijing, Taipei and Seoul during 
the course of the exposition.  Both of these events has the possibility of improving the 
trust between Japan and South Korea, making future changes to Japan’s security structure 
more acceptable. 
I. SUMMARY 
As summarized in Table 3 below, Seoul appears to accept the inevitable increase 
in Japan’s role in regional and global security and stability affairs.  But it remains 
cautious of attempts to do so outside the U.S.–Japan security framework. South Korea’s 
experience with North Korea over the past 50 years has shaped Seoul’s view that national 
security issues are not seen as threatening to stability of the region.  The major concern 
that Seoul has regarding Tokyo is operations outside of the U.S.–Japan security 
framework.  Historical issues and territorial disputes when handled bilaterally have 
caused tension in the relationship between Japan and South Korea.  An expansion of 
bilateral military, economic and cultural exchanges can help to improve this mutual 
distrust. While Japan and the South Korea remain engaged in security matters, outside 
factors such as Japanese historical issues have often caused security relations to be 
temporarily interrupted. South Korea and Japan have made some headway recently to 
keep this issue from interfering with security issues, but an underlying resentment 
remains.  In order for relations to truly progress, Japan must develop a plan that addresses 
concerns that both the South Korean government and nationalist elements within the 
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Case Study Afghanistan PSI Missile Defense Security 
Oriented 
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Case Study Iraq Tsunami Relief Historical Issues Stability 
Oriented 
Activities Reaction Cautious support Competition and Balance 
Diplomatic and 
Public Pressure 
Table 3. South Korean Perceptions of Japanese Stability and Security Activities 
 
It is unlikely that there are any major obstacles in the Korean peninsula to 
initiatives to expand the scope and capability of the Japan Self Defense Forces.  Seoul 
will, however, likely remain suspicious of Japanese motives while historical issues 
remain unresolved.  Reaching an acceptable compromise on these issues will be difficult, 
but as greater cultural and economic exchanges such as the proposed Free Trade 
Agreement become closer to a reality greater trust will continue to grow. Cultural trust 
will not only decrease suspicion of the expanding JSDF mission, but will also head off 
concerns over a perceived revival of Japanese militarism.  Seoul will need to understand 
that growing Japanese nationalism does not mean growing militarism.  Expansion of 
confidence-building measures with the South Korean military will be critical to ensuring 
that the Seoul does not become apprehensive of Japanese security efforts.  Seoul and 
Tokyo will, however, need to ensure that these exchanges are not seen as overly 
threatening to North Korea.  As the South Korea–Japan relationship improves, it is likely 
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VI. CONCLUSION - MANAGING GLOBAL PERCEPTIONS 
Changes to the mission of the JSDF can improve the stability of the region, but to 
do this they must be done in cooperation with regional partners. An active and open 
security dialogue is essential to reducing fears and suspicions of a new militarization of 
Japan.  Increased cultural exchanges also have a similar effect on reducing tensions.  
Upcoming events, such as the 2005 World Expo in Aichi, the 2008 Summer Olympics in 
Beijing, and the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai all have the potential to bring the three 
major powers of Northeast Asia closer together, but any major incidents occurring at 
thesr events have the potential to create a serious public backlash. 
A. REGIONAL VIEWS OF THE JSDF 
Relations between Japan and the Korean Peninsula have long been troubled due to 
cultural misunderstandings and conflicting views of security, yet Japanese and Korean 
security issues are intertwined and often inseparable. South Korea has emerged as a 
growing economic power and democratic nation, and North Korea’s isolation has led to 
fits of nuclear brinkmanship and threats to turn Tokyo into a “sea of fire.” North Korean 
actions have provided almost daily reminders to the Japanese public of the potential 
threat from one of Japan’s closest neighbors and are one of the forces legitimizing the 
rapid changes in the Japanese defense structure.  South Korea, on the other hand, has 
worked to try and improve relations with Japan in order to ensure that it is not left out of 
the U.S. security apparatus.  This has opened the two countries to greater cooperation and 
has been key to improving trust between the nations.  Chinese views of Japan have been 
influenced by the government’s use of historical issues as a negotiating tool.  This has 
created an extremely negative opinion of Japanese in China and a strong distrust of the 
JSDF. 
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF NORMALIZATION EFFORTS 
Transformation and eventual “normalization” of the Self Defense Forces in order 
to meet regional and global security commitments can be accomplished without upsetting 
the regional balance of power.  To do this, Japan must maintain a strict commitment to 
global peace and the “three non-nuclear principles.” Revisions to the constitution that 
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allow greater participation in international efforts can occur without removing references 
to the renunciation of belligerency as a right of the state. Because Japan’s growing 
military involvement in world affairs will provoke concerns among regional neighbors, 
these perceptions must be considered and a concerted effort at transparency maintained.  
The key to developing an internationally recognized military presence will be gradual 
changes in capabilities and mission and increased security cooperation with South Korea 
and China.  
Non-military political issues, such as visits by Prime Minister Koizumi to the 
Yasukuni Jinja and textbook issues, can complicate efforts. Japan has many tough 
decisions regarding establishing priorities between domestic concerns and international 
participation. By yielding to nationalist elements attempting to redefine Japan’s history 
Tokyo jeopardizes its ability to work with regional neighbors to solve various crises.  
Japan must be careful in dealing with historical issues and should actively press 
engagement with Seoul and Beijing when relations become tense.  Only through an active 
role can Japan help to diffuse tensions in the region.  Active engagement with regional 
partners can not only help to resolve outstanding security issues but also can improve 
Japan’s international standing.  Japan must be ready for the worst, but endeavor for the 
best.  As the word for crisis, kiki (危機) expresses in Japanese, Chinese and Korean, future 
efforts can bring about both danger (危) and opportunity (機). 
C. OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. SUPPORT TO JSDF EXPANSION 
The U.S.–Japan Security relationship remains a pivotal aspect of the U.S. security 
strategy in Asia.  The relationship has, however, grown more complex with the end of the 
Cold War. As the Japanese military moves into greater global responsibilities, internal 
and external cultural obstacles emerged. Questions about the legality and limit of 
deployments are far from being answered and will greatly influence the path that Japan 
will take with regards to constitutional reforms. Every year brings new changes to the 
relationship and more responsibilities to both partners.  With continued support from the 
United States, Japan can become not just an assistant in maintaining peace and stability, 
but a true regional and even global partner.  This can, perhaps, best be summed up by the 
experiences of ex-Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who during a recent 
interview said: 
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I've been involved in U.S.–Japan relations since 1967 when I first went to 
Japan, and I think I can say that every single year U.S.–Japan relations 
have gotten more important, not less.  I'm not talking just about kindness 
of Japan and Japanese citizens in hosting U.S. forces.  I'm talking about 
the full relationship––the economic, political, cultural; the way we 
cooperate on many issues across the globe has become more important. 
I'm quite proud of it.186
The goal of the United States in the mid-term should be to increase the trust and 
understanding that Asian nations regarding Japanese intentions.  Washington should, 
therefore, continue to reaffirm the importance of the United States–Japan security 
structure.  Although the United States has continued to place emphasis on maintaining 
the security partnership with both South Korea and Japan, a force drawdown or 
restructuring in Northeast Asia should be undertaken such that there is no question of the 
of the willingness of the United States to ensure peace and stability. A sudden, unilateral 
withdrawal of forces from Japan would bring many U.S. security partnerships into 
question.  The withdrawal of U.S. forces would create a destabilizing security vacuum in 
Asia.  A new arms race in Asia would likely result, possibly leading to a regional conflict 
between increasingly modern military powers.   
Also of concern would be Japan’s reaction to the use of U.S. bases in Japan.  The 
U.S.–Japan Security Treaty states: “For the purpose of contributing to the security of 
Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the U.S. is 
granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.”187 The 
“Far East” has traditionally been defined as areas of the western Pacific, north of the 
Philippines. Theoretically this would limit the ability of forces assigned to Japan to 
operate outside of that clearly defined “Far East” area.  This definition has, in reality, 
often been ignored, as units stationed in Japan have often take part in operations outside 
of the Far East, a rapid expansion of the mission area of forces assigned to Japan could be 
cause make Japanese efforts at transparency more difficult. 
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The United States should also encourage greater participation by Japan in both 
regional and global security operations and dialogues. Key among these will be in 
forums that increase cooperation between Japan, China and both Koreas.  Confidence-
building measures will also be critical to ensure that other nations in the region do not 
become overly suspicious of Japanese and American security efforts.  Greater Japanese 
leadership in regional and global affairs will also decrease the burden on the United 
States, allowing for greater involvement in other affairs throughout the globe.  In addition 
to the trilateral meetings, Japan must be encouraged to take a greater role in regional 
security mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the United States should 
continue to press actively for Japan’s attainment of a permanent seat on the United 
Nations Security Council. Development of stronger ties with Russia, South Korea, and/or 
China can also reduce the need for the United States to provide a security guarantee for 
Japan.  Such a move would however require Japan to resolve many issues that have 
hindered its relations with all three countries.  Japan–Russia relations have stagnated over 
the disposition of the four “Northern Territory” islands claimed by Japan, but occupied 
by Russia since the end of World War II.  This incident has dragged on without 
resolution and actually inhibited the signing of an official peace treaty.  As shown 
throughout this thesis, relations with South Korea and China continue to be strained. 
Finally, the long-term goal of the United States has been, and is the eventual 
“normalization” of Japan as a nation with a commensurate increase in its role in 
maintaining the peace and stability of Asia. In order to do this the United States should 
prepare Japan and South Korea for the eventual decrease in U.S. forces in Northeast 
Asia. As greater requirements are being placed on United States military assets 
throughout the world, the United States will be more dependent on its allies to help 
provide security.  In the event of another major regional crisis outside of the Pacific, there 
is a high possibility that additional forces could be removed from Northeast Asia.  In such 
a situation, Japan must be in a position both diplomatically and militarily to provide for 
its own defense and support the overall stability of the region and not upset the regional 
balance. 
77 
APPENDIX A: TIMELINE OF EVENTS AFFECTING JAPANESE 
SECURITY POLICY, MARCH 1990 TO JANUARY 2005 
Date Event 
March 2, 1990 Soviet Union agrees to withdrawal of forces from Mongolia 
June 4-5, 1990 Cambodian Peace Conference in Tokyo 
August 2, 1990 Iraq invades Kuwait 
August 30, 1990 Japan offers $1 billion for restoration of peace in the Middle 
East 
September 14, 1990 Japan increases offer to $3 billion for peace restoration in the 
Middle East 
October 16, 1990 Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations submitted to Diet 
November 10, 1990 Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations fails to pass 
November 12, 1990 JSDF takes part in sokui no rei (Emperor’s accession) 
ceremony 
December 20, 1990 Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) for 1991-1995 
approved by Cabinet 
January 17, 1991 Operation Desert Storm commences 
January 24, 1991 Japan pledges an additional $9 billion for efforts to restore 
peace to the Middle East 
January 25, 1991 Cabinet approves ordinance on interim measures for the 
airlifting of Arabian Gulf refugees 
February 28, 1991 Coalition forces involved in Operation Desert Storm cease 
combat operations 
April 26, 1991 Six JMSDF minesweepers dispatched to Arabian Gulf 
July 10, 1991 Russian President Boris Yeltsin takes office 
September 17, 1991 South and North Korea simultaneously admitted to United 
Nations 
October 6, 1991 JSDF personnel assist United Nations teams in chemical 
weapon inspections 
February 25, 1992 China enacts Territorial Waters Act, designating the Senkaku 
Islands as part of China 
May 25, 1992 IAEA officials make first inspection of North Korean 
Nuclear facilities 
June 29, 1992 Revision of Law Concerning the Dispatch of International 
Disaster Relief Teams enacted 
July 2, 1992 United States announces the complete withdrawal of ground 
and sea based tactical nuclear weapons from overseas 
August 10, 1992 International Peace Cooperation Law in Effect 
September 17, 1992 – 
September 26, 1993 
JSDF participates in the United Nations Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) 
October 23-28, 1992 Emperor and Empress visit China 
78 
Date Event 
November 24, 1992 United States completes withdrawal of armed forces from 
the Philippines 
December 18, 1992 Cabinet approves change to MTDP for 1991-1995 
January 13, 1993 Japan signs the Convention on the prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons (CWC) 
March 12, 1993 North Korea announces withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
May 11, 1993 – 
January 8, 1995 
JSDF participates in the United Nations Operation in 
Mozambique (ONUMOZ)  
May 29, 1993 North Korea conducts Ballistic Missile test in the Sea of 
Japan 
June 11, 1993 North Korea announces that they “reserve the right” to 
withdraw from the NPT 
March 1, 1994 First Japan-China security dialogue in Beijing 
March 3-14, 1994 IAEA inspections of seven North Korean nuclear facilities 
March 31, 1994 UNSC adopts resolution urging North Korea to complete 
nuclear inspections 
April 4, 1994 North Korea rejects UNSC resolution 
July 8, 1994 North Korean Leader Kim-Il Sung dies 
July 25, 1994 First ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Bangkok 
September 17, 1994 – 
December 28, 1994 
JSDF dispatched to Zaire to assist Rwandan refugees  
October 21, 1994 Agreed Framework between United States and North Korea 
signed 
November 9, 1994 First Japan-ROK working level defense policy dialogue held 
in Seoul 
January 17, 1995 JSDF participates in disaster relief for Hanshin-Awaji 
Earthquake 
March 9, 1995 Korean peninsula Energy Development Organization 
(KEDO) established 
March 20, 1995 JSDF dispatched in response to Sarin gas attack in Tokyo by 
Aum Shinrikyo 
June 5, 1995 Japan and South Korea begin to establish measures to 
prevent accidents between military aircraft 
June 9, 1995– 
December 14, 1995 
Security Council of Japan conducts 13 meetings on the state 
of future defense capabilities 
November 19, 1995 Prime Minister Murayama and Vice President Gore agree to 
the establishment of the Special Action Committee on 
Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (SACO) 
November 28, 1995 Cabinet approves National Defense Program Outline 
(NDPO) 
December 15, 1995 Cabinet approves MTDP for 1996-2000 
March 8-25, 1996 China conducts major exercise opposite Taiwan 
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Date Event 
March 23, 1996 Taiwan hosts first direct Presidential election 
April 17, 1996 Japan and United States issue Joint Declaration on Security 
July 20, 1996 United Nations Treaty on the Law of the Seas goes into 
effect in Japan 
July 29, 1996 China conducts nuclear test prior to declaring moratorium 
September 2-6, 1996 First visit of JMSDF ship to South Korea 
September 10, 1996 United nations General Assembly adopts Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
September 18, 1996 North Korean mini-submarine runs aground off South Korea 
December 2, 1996 SACO final report approved by Joint United States–Japan 
Security Council 
December 13, 1996 First Japan-Russia defense official cooperation meeting 
December 24, 1996 Cabinet approves response plan for foreign submarines 
traveling underwater in Japanese territorial waters 
January 20, 1997 Establishment of Japan Defense Intelligence Headquarters 
March 14, 1997 China enacts national Defense Law 
July 1, 1997 Hong Kong reverts to PRC authority 
December 3, 1997 Japan signs Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty 
December 19, 1997 Review of MTDP for 1996-2000 approved 
March 26, 1998 JSDF introduces ready reserve force system 
May 11 & 13, 1998 India conducts underground nuclear test 
May 18, 1998 JASDF C-130 dispatched to Singapore in support of possible 
NEO due to Indonesian riots 
May 28, 1998 Pakistan conducts underground nuclear test 
June 12, 1998 Second Revision of International Peace Cooperation Law 
comes into effect 
June 26, 1998 First Japan-South Korea Security Dialogue held in Seoul 
July 12, 1998 Revision of International Peace Cooperation Law regarding 
the use of force comes into effect 
July 27, 1998 China publishes first Defense of China White Paper 
July 29, 1998 JMSDF, JASDF and Russian Navy conduct first combined 
search and rescue operation 
August 31, 1998 North Korea conducts Taepo Dong missile launch over 
Japan 
November 13, 1998 – 
December 9, 1998 
JSDF dispatched for Disaster relief in Honduras 
November 15, 1998 JSDF conducts first joint exercise involving all branches of 
service 
December 18, 1998 South Korea sinks North Korean semi-submersible 
infiltration craft in territorial waters 




December 25, 1998 Security Council of Japan approves United States–Japan 
cooperative research on Ballistic Missile Defense 
Technologies 
March 23-24, 1999 Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) and JMSDF react to suspected 
North Korean mothership off Noto Peninsula 
April 1, 1999 Establishment of the Committee on promotion of the 
Information-Gathering Satellite 
May 28, 1999 Bill partially amending the Self Defense Force Law 
regarding the Transportation of Japanese citizens and others 
in foreign countries enacted coincident to decision by 
Cabinet on the usage of JASDF and JMSDF equipment in 
transporting Japanese nationals 
June 15, 1999 North Korean and South Korean Navies clash in Northern 
Limit Line incident 
August 5, 1999 First Joint Search and Rescue Exercise between JMSDF and 
South Korean Navy 
August 16, 1999 Signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between 
Russian and Japanese Defense Officials on Infrastructure 
Building for the Development of Dialogue and Exchange 
August 16, 1999 Signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between 
United States and Japanese Defense Officials regarding 
Cooperative Research on Ballistic Missile Defense 
August 25, 1999 Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security 
in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan in effect 
September 23, 1999 – 
November 22, 1999 
JSDF dispatched to support Earthquake relief in Turkey 
September 30, 1999 – 
October 3, 1999 
JSDF support containment efforts of an accident at the 
Tokaimura uranium processing facility 
November 22, 1999 –  
February 8, 2000 
JSDF dispatched to East Timor in support of refugee 
situation  
December 17, 1999 Security council approves investigation of Functions Related 
to in-flight refueling 
May 8, 2000 Defense Agency moves into new building at Ichigaya 
September 8, 2000 JMSDF Officer arrested for leaking secret information to 
Russian military attaché 
September 13, 2000 JSDF personnel dispatched to Beian, China to dispose of 
abandoned chemical weapons 
September 23, 2000 – 
November 6, 2000 
JSDF personnel assist in disposal of chemical bombs found 
in Lake Kussharo, Japan 
November 20, 2000 Japanese Communist Party decides to accept the legality of 
the JSDF 
December 15, 2000 Cabinet approves MTDP for 2001-2005 
February 5, 2001 –  
February 11, 2001 
JSDF dispatched to India for disaster relief operations 
February 9, 2001 JSDF personnel dispatched to UNMOVIC 
81 
Date Event 
February 10, 2001 US Navy submarine collides with Ehime Maru 
February 14, 2001 Russian Tu-22M backfire intrudes into Japanese airspace 
March 1, 2001 The Ship inspection law, aimed primarily at North Korean 
vessels, come into effect 
April 11, 2001 Additional Russian military aircraft intrude into Japanese 
airspace 
April 26, 2001 Koizumi cabinet formed 
June 15, 2001 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) established 
August 10, 2001 – 
December 16, 2001 
Submarine Rescue ship the Chihaya conducts recover 
operations of the Ehime Maru 
August 13, 2001 PM Koizumi first visit to the Yasukuni Jinja as Prime 
Minister 
September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks on the United States 
September 19, 2001 PM Koizumi announces establishment of seven measures in 
response to the 9/11 attacks  
October 5, 2001 Cabinet adopts the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Bill 
October 8, 2001 Government of Japan establishes Emergency Anti-Terrorism 
Headquarters  
November 2, 2001 Adoption of Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and Law 
to Amend the Self-Defense Forces Law (guarding 
operations, use of weapons in peacetime for guarding SDF 
facilities, information gathering before a public security 
operation is ordered, enhanced authority in use of weapons 
while in public security operation and maritime security 
operation, strengthening penalties to ensure secrecy)  
November 9, 2001 JMSDF dispatched to the Indian Ocean for “information-
gathering” mission 
November 29, 2001 JMSDF supply vessel, minesweeper tender, and destroyers 
depart for cooperation and support activities in the Indian 
Ocean 
December 2, 2001 – 
December 14, 2001 
Meeting between JGSDF and US Forces Japan regarding the 
use of JGSDF personnel in the defense of USFJ bases 
December 14, 2001 A bill is introduced to partially amend the Law Concerning 
Cooperation for U.N. PKOs and Other Operations 
(expansion of defense objectives to use weapons, the 
absolution of the exemption from Article 95 of the Self-
Defense Forces Law and the absolution of the freeze on 
Peacekeeping Force headquarter activities)  
December 14, 2001 Security Council approves the Selection of In-flight 
Refueling Transportation Aircraft Type 
December 22, 2001 Japan Coast Guard fire on and sinks a North Korean 
infiltration mothership off the southwest coast of Kyushu 
January 21-22, 2002 Japan hosts International Conference on Reconstruction 
Assistance to Afghanistan 
82 
Date Event 
January 29, 2002 Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures law, JMSDF 
supply ship commences refueling operations in the Indian 
Ocean 
January 29, 2002 President Bush defines “Axis of Evil” 
February 13, 2002 Thirteenth dispatch of peacekeeping forces to the Golan 
Heights  
March 2, 2002 First JSDF dispatch of 680 personnel to East Timor, includes 
first out of area deployment of JMS Ozumi 
March 18, 2002 Japan – South Korea summit meeting held 
March 27, 2002 Implementation of law to partially amend the Defense 
Agency Establishment Law and Self-Defense Forces Law (to 
change the authorized strength of SDF personnel and ready 
reserve personnel, the Introduction of Candidate for Reserve 
Personnel, and disaster call-up for reserve personnel) 
April 12, 2002 Japan – China summit held  
April 16, 2002 Cabinet decisions on the bill to amend the Law on the 
Establishment of the Security Council of Japan, the bill to 
respond to Armed Attacks and the bill to amend the Self-
Defense Forces Law 
May 1-5, 2002 Director General of the Defense Agency Nakatani Gen 
inspects JMSDF ships dispatched to the Indian ocean 
May 13, 2002 Japan – United States – South Korea Trilateral Coordination 
and  Oversight Group (TCOG) meet in Tokyo 
May 17, 2002 Cabinet decision to extend the Basic Plan to provide military 
support to counter-terrorism campaign until November 19, 
2002 
May 31, 2002 FIFA World Cup jointly hosted by Japan and South Korea 
June 13, 2002 United States formally withdraws from Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) Treaty 
August 14, 2002 Fourteenth dispatch of peacekeeping forces to the Golan 
Heights 
September 11, 2002 Second Japan – South Korea Joint Naval Search and Rescue 
Exercise 
September 20, 2002 Second JSDF dispatch of 680 personnel to East Timor 
October 3, 2002 U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly visits North 
Korea 
October 15, 2002 Multilateral Search and Rescue exercise hosted in Sagami 
Bay  
October 16, 2002 United States announces that North Korea admitted to 
possession of a Uranium Enrichment plan during visit by 
Assistant Secretary of State Kelly to North Korea 
November 1, 2002 Law to amend the Self Defense Force Law to strengthen 
security is enacted 
November 14, 2002 Japan – South Korea Defense Summit (Ishiba – Lee) 
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Date Event 
November 15, 2002 Hu Jintao elected as General Secretary of the Communist 
Party of China 
November 18, 2002 JSDF and local police hold joint command post exercise in 
Hokkaido 
November 19, 2002 Cabinet decision to extend the Basic Plan to provide military 
support to counter-terrorism campaign until May 19, 2003 
December 12, 2002 North Korea announces it will resume processing of nuclear 
material 
December 16, 2002 JMS Kirishima, an AEGIS destroyer is dispatched to support 
Anti-Terrorism operations in the Indian Ocean 
December 17, 2002 Japan – United States Defense Meeting (Ishiba – Rumsfeld) 
December 19, 2002 Roh Muoo-hyun elected President of South Korea 
January 14, 2003 Japan – Russia Defense Summit Meeting (Ishiba – Ivanov) 
February 26, 2003 Fifteenth dispatch of peacekeeping forces to the Golan 
Heights 
March 2, 2003 North Korean Fighter intercepts U.S. reconnaissance aircraft 
in the Sea of Japan  
March 13, 2003 Third JSDF dispatch of 680 personnel to East Timor 
March20, 2003 U.S. and UK forces begin combat operations in Iraq 
March 27, 2003 Law to Partially Amend the Defense Agency Establishment 
Law is enforced (change of the authorized end-strength of 
JSDF uniformed personnel and ready reserve personnel) 
March 29, 2003 Japan – South Korea Defense Summit Meeting (Ishiba-Cho) 
March 31, 2003 – 
April 2, 2003 
Japan dispatches relief supplies to Amman, Jordan for 
expected Iraqi refugees in support of the UNHCR 
April 2, 2003 South Korea adopts resolution to dispatch troops to Iraq 
April 11, 2003 Japan – Russia Defense Summit Meeting (Ishiba-Ivanov) 
April 16, 2003 Three Armed Attack situation bills approved by Cabinet, 
(bills put forth a framework for dealing with a military 
emergency, including clarifying the government's decision-
making process; strengthening the authority of the prime 
minister, such as empowering the prime minister to give 
instructions to local governments; facilitating action by the 
Self-Defense Forces; and establishing the obligation of 
citizens to cooperate and setting limits on personal rights) 
April 21, 2003 – 
May 1, 2003 
JASDF in-flight refueling training meeting 
April 23, 2003 United States – North Korea – China trilateral meeting held 
in Beijing 
May 1, 2003 End of Major combat operations announced in Iraq and 
Afghanistan 
May 4, 2003 Japan – India Defense Summit Meeting (Ishiba-Fernandes) 
May 9, 2003 Cabinet decision to extend the Basic Plan to provide military 




May 31, 2003 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) announced by the 
United States 
June 2, 2003 Japan – United States Defense Meeting (Ishiba-Wolfowitz) 
June 6, 2003 Three Armed Attack situation Laws enacted 
June 7, 2003 Japan – South Korea summit held 
June 20, 2003 Cabinet decision made for revision of the implementation 
plan on international peace cooperation activities in East 
Timor 
July 26, 2003 Law concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and 
Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq passed 
August 6 – 12 , 2003 SCO holds joint anti-terrorism exercise 
August 18, 2003 Russia conducts large scale exercise in Far East Region 
August 26, 2003 Japan – New Zealand Defense Summit (Ishiba – Burton) 
August 27 – 29, 2003 First round of Six-Party Talks 
September 1, 2003 China announces reduction of PLA by 200,000 troops 
September 3, 2003 Japan – China Defense Summit (Ishiba – Cao) 
September 10, 2003 Sixteenth dispatch of peacekeeping forces to the Golan 
Heights 
September 12 – 14, 2003 First PSI exercise held in Coral Sea 
September 29, 2003 Japan – Australia defense Summit (Ishiba – Hill) 
September 30, 2003 Cabinet approves first individual award for personnel 
assigned to “dangerous activities” 
October 2, 2003 North Korean Foreign Ministry announces conclusion of 
nuclear reprocessing operations 
October 7, 2003 Joint communiqué signed for the first time at Japan – China 
– South Korea Summit meeting 
October 7, 2003 Japan – Mongolia Defense Summit (Ishiba – Gurragchaa) 
October 10, 2003 Defense Ministry Establishment bill scrapped in conjunction 
with dissolution of House of Representatives 
October 15, 2003 China successfully conducts a manned space launch 
October 21, 2003 Cabinet decision to extend the Basic Plan to provide military 
support to counter-terrorism campaign until May 1, 2004 
October 23, 2003 Fourth JSDF dispatch of personnel to East Timor 
October 24, 2003 Japan announces $5 billion in aid at the International Donors 
Conference for the Reconstruction of Iraq in Spain  
October 26, 2003 Fleet review hosted in Sagami Bay 
November 14, 2003 Koizumi-Rumsfeld meeting held in Tokyo 
November 15, 2003 Japan – United States Defense Summit (Ishiba-Rumsfeld) 
November 15, 2003 JSDF special research group dispatched to Iraq 
November 26, 2003 Japan – South Korea Defense Summit (Ishiba – Cho) 
November 29, 2003 Japanese Ambassador Oku Katsuhiko and First Secretary 
Inoue Masamori shot to death in Iraq 




December 4, 2003 Australia announces participation in ballistic missile defense 
program 
December 9, 2003 EU delegation visits North Korea 
December 18, 2003 Defense Agency formulates guidelines for law concerning 
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq 
December 19, 2003 Japan announces decision to introduce a ballistic missile 
defense system 
December 26, 2003 JASDF advance team arrives in Kuwait 
December 30, 2003 –  
January 6, 2004 
Japan provides disaster relief in support of Kerman 
earthquake in Iran 
February 3, 2004 Advance team of JGSDF personnel departs for Iraq 
February 14 – 16, 2004 JMSDF supply ships depart for Kuwait to support JGSDF 
mission 
February 25 – 28, 2004 Second Six-Party Talks held in Beijing 
March 3, 2004 JASDF begins transportation of medical relief supplies into 
Iraq 
March 3, 2004 Seventeenth dispatch of peacekeeping forces to the Golan 
Heights 
March 26, 2004 Diet approves introduction of ballistic missile defense 
system 
March 27, 2004 Approximately 600 JGSDF personnel arrive in Samawah, 
Iraq 
April 8, 2004 Japanese hostages taken in Iraq 
April 27, 2004 First meeting of Council for Security and Defense 
Capabilities 
April 23, 2004 Cabinet decision to extend the Basic Plan to provide military 
support to counter-terrorism campaign until November 1, 
2004 
May 18, 2004 United States announces dispatch of 3,600 troops from 
Korea to Iraq 
May 20, 2004 Conclusion of Japanese mission to East Timor and turnover 
of equipment 
May 22, 2004 Japan North Korea Summit held in Pyongyang 
May 31, 2004 First rotation of JGSDF returns from Iraq 
August, 2004 China hosts Asian World Cup Soccer match, Japanese fans 
met with strong protest 
October, 2004 Japan hosts second exercise in support of PSI 
December 10, 2004 Cabinet approves NDPO and MTDP for 2005-2010 
Information in this appendix is derived from the Nihon Boueichou (Japan Defense 
Agency) Internet website http://www.jda.go.jp, Defense of Japan Annual White Papers 
from 1991 to 2004, the Japan Foreign Press Center (http://www.fpcj.jp), as well as 






























APPENDIX B: DEPLOYMENTS OF THE JAPAN SELF-DEFENSE 
FORCE FOR OVERSEAS MISSIONS  
     (As of March 2005) 








Units 4/91–10/91 N/A 
Clear waterways of mines and 
obstructions 
Cease-fire 
Monitors 9/92 –9/93 8 (x2) 
Monitoring the storage of collected 
weapons and cease-fire observance 





Engineering Unit 9/92–9/93 600 (x2) 
Construction of roads, bridges, etc.; 
supply of fuel and water to UNTAC 
division 
Staff Officers 5/93–1/95 5 (x2) 
Performing operations planning at 
ONUMOZ headquarters and 
coordinating transportation 
 







5/93–1/95 48 (x3) Technical coordination and allocation of transportation 
Refugee Relief 
Units 9/94–12/94 260 
Medical care, sanitation, water 
purification, epidemic prevention 
Humanitarian  
Relief 




Unit 9/94–12/94 118 Airlift relief units and supplies 
Staff Officers 2/96–Present 2 (x10) 
Public relations of UNDOF 
headquarters; planning and 
coordination of transport and 
maintenance work 
Transport Units 2/96–Present 43 (x17) 
Transport of food, storage of supplies 
in storage areas, road repair, and 
maintenance of heavy equipment, etc.
 








4 to 6 on 
several 
occasions 
Liaison and coordination activities for 
the Self-Defense Forces unit and staff 
officers with related organizations 





Unit 11/98–12/98 105 







Transport Unit 9/99-11/99 426 Maritime transport of relief supplies 
Humanitarian 
Relief 
Operation for  
East Timorese 
Air Transport 
Units 11/99–2/00 113 
Air transport of aid material in 
support of the UNHCR 
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Units 10/01 138 
Air transport of aid material in 
support of the UNHCR 
Headquarters 
Staff 2/02-5/04 10 (x4) 
Plan and coordinate engineering and 
logistic operations 
United Nations  
Mission in East 
Timor 
(UNAMET) Engineering Unit 3/02-5/04 680 (x4) 






Unit 3/03–4/03 56 
Air transport of aid material in 
support of the UNHCR 




Transport Units 12/03-Present N/A 
Air and maritime transport of supplies 
and equipment. 
Maritime/Ground 
Support Unit 12/04–3/05 970 
Joint force providing medical relief 
and transport of aid material Asian Tsunami 
Relief Air Transport 
Unit 12/04–3/05 ~800 
Air transport of aid material in 
support of tsunami relief 




1. Other operations include support activities in areas of transport and supply 
carried out by units of the JMSDF in Cambodia and East Timor and the 
JASDF in Cambodia, Mozambique, Golan Heights and Afghanistan. 




                                                
APPENDIX C: JAPANESE TRADE STATISTICS, 1975-2004 





















1975 16,545 17,170 667 389 53 19 670 455 541 241 
1980 29,382 31,995 1,225 681 85 42 1,141 978 1,169 522 
1985 41,956 31,085 1,694 977 59 43 2,991 1,552 1,205 811 
1988 33,939 24,006 1,978 1,515 31 42 1,214 1,264 1,839 1,120 
1989 37,823 28,979 2,281 1,788 27 41 1,165 1,534 2,122 1,231 
1990 41,457 33,855 2,518 1,690 25 43 884 1,730 2,234 1,232 
1991 42,360 31,900 2,704 1,663 30 38 1,157 1,914 2,460 1,281 
1992 43,012 29,527 2,253 1,466 28 33 1,510 2,145 2,679 1,200 
1993 40,202 26,826 2,124 1,297 24 28 1,911 2,278 2,456 1,078 
1994 40,498 28,104 2,489 1,380 17 33 1,914 2,811 2,434 1,100 
1995 41,531 31,549 2,928 1,622 24 32 2,062 3,381 2,710 1,347 
1996 44,731 37,993 3,192 1,735 25 32 2,382 4,400 2,825 1,628 
1997 50,938 40,956 3,153 1,763 22 37 2,631 5,062 3,335 1,511 
1998 50,645 36,654 2,005 1,577 23 29 2,621 4,844 3,340 1,336 
1999 47,548 35,268 2,606 1,824 17 23 2,657 4,875 3,276 1,456 
2000 51,654 40,938 3,309 2,205 22 28 3,274 5,941 3,874 1,930 
2001 48,979 42,416 3,072 2,088 130188 27 3,764 7,027 2,942 1,723 
2002 52,109 42,228 3,572 1,937 17 29 4,980 7,728 3,281 1,699 
2003 54,548 44,362 4,022 2,071 11 20 6,635 8,731 3,610 1,656 
2004 61,182 49,177 4,786 2,385 9.6 17 7,996 10,198 4,543 1,802 
Data compiled from Nihon Toukeikyoku (Japan Statistics Bureau). “Foreign Trade, Balance of 
Payments and International Cooperation.” Nihon Soumushou (Japan Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications), 2004. http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/nenkan/1431-15.htm (accessed February 19, 
2004) and Nihon Zeikan (Japan Customs). “Monthly and Yearly Trade Statistics of Japan.” Nihon 
Zaimushou (Japan Ministry of Finance), 2004. http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/suii/html/time_e.htm 
(accessed February 19, 2005). 
 
188 This number includes almost 500,000MT of husked Brown rice that Japan sent to North Korea as 
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